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This research created a new theoretical Soft Computing (SC) hybridized
network intrusion detection diagnostic system including complex hybridization of
a 3D full color Self-Organizing Map (SOM), Artificial Immune System Danger
Theory (AISDT), and a Fuzzy Inference System (FIS). This SOM+ diagnostic
archetype includes newly defined intrusion types to facilitate diagnostic analysis,
a descriptive computational model, and an Invisible Mobile Network Bridge
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CHAPTER 1-- INTRODUCTION

The widespread need for improved network intrusion detection is clear. A
recent United States Air Force manual, for example, emphasizes, ―The United
States is vulnerable to cyberspace attacks by relentless adversaries attempting
to infiltrate our networks at work and at home – millions of times a day, 24/7.‖ [1]
(US Air Force 2010) Computer intrusions are pervasive in our networking and
have easily cost billions of dollars of resources in recent years considering the
lost time of users continually updating operating systems and other software, the
cost of hiring information security teams, the lost time of rebuilding computer
operating systems after they have become infected, and the cost of the recovery
processes of individuals whose identities have been stolen.
Information security is a complex and inexact process involving devious
malignant people with a broad range of skills from technical to social engineering.
Intrusion detection involves subterfuge and many deceptions and spoofs where
things are not as they appear to be. Even security officers can be disgruntled
employees posing insider threats. This complexity and ambiguity involved with
intrusion detection leads to Soft Computing for solutions.
This research represents six years of studying network intrusion detection,
progressing from traditional packet and log analysis to general Soft Computing
methods, and, then, specifically, to create, implement, test, and evaluate a new
theoretical Soft Computing (SC) hybridized network intrusion detection diagnostic
system to project Self Organizing Map (SOM) output to a 3D full color visual
display and process this output through a second layer Fuzzy Inference System
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(FIS) to better interpret the results. Artificial Immune System Danger Theory
(AISDT) was studied to see if this could be hybridized with the SOM. This SOM+
diagnostic archetype included an Invisible Mobile Network Bridge (IMNB) to
collect data, a descriptive intrusion detection computational model to describe the
methodology, and newly defined intrusion types to facilitate diagnostic analysis of
results, while maintaining compatibility with traditional packet analysis. The goals
for this system included being modular, multitaskable, scalable, intuitive, and
adaptable to quickly changing scenarios while using relatively few resources.
While Soft Computing methods have been researched in intrusion
detection, several theoretical ideas of this research are new: the 3D full color
SOM visual display with the hybridized FIS and AISDT, the Invisible Mobile
Network Bridge (IMNB) for data collection and monitoring, the intrusion detection
computational model, and the newly defined intrusion types. All of these novel
theories together form a cohesive new diagnostic system for intrusion detection.
This ID diagnostic system is based on a medical center metaphor: medical
diagnosis is based on a multitude of possible analytical tests such as x-rays, CAT
scans, urine tests, and blood tests. Various medical tests are often used and a
diagnosis is typically based on a fusion of multiple test results. Likewise with
network intrusion detection, multiple analytical methods are needed with
analytical methods to fuse the results.
This research originated with creation of ANNaBell, a SOM Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) placed into production which has successfully detected
feral malware, including Storm Worm bot infections. A SOM is a type of Artificial
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Neural Network (ANN), and ANNaBell is named for being an ANN that rings a
bell (sends an alert) when malware is detected. ANNaBell discovered an infected
computer on March 29, 2008, being the first known time that a self-trained
computational intelligence has discovered previously unknown feral malicious
software. ANNaBell first discovered a Storm Worm infected computer on August
12, 2008, and was still in production as this was written approximately three
years later.
This research redoubles capabilities of computational intelligence for
intrusion detection for malware not previously known. Traditional packet analysis
intrusion detection is stymied by the continuously evolving command and control
network traffic. This diagnostic model assists in overcoming this barrier by using
Internet traffic recorded by an Invisible Mobile Network Bridge (IMNB) to indicate
locally infected computers. This research concerns the analysis of
multidimensional data. One of the advantages of this methodology is the
representation of multidimensional data into a smaller dimensional space. A
meta-hexagonal map mitigates the so-called curse of dimensionality by labeling
complex data areas with simple explanatory names such as green zone and red
zone to help further visualize the data.
Chapter 2 provides background, review of the literature, and state of the
art information for initial components of this research including types of intrusion
detection, data preparation, feature reduction, clustering and classification, the
intrusion detection problem, and the use of Soft Computing methods in intrusion
detection. Chapter 3 covers the early methodology and development of
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components of this research including Local Landline Network Intrusion
Detection System (LLNIDS) Types of Intrusion Detection, the LLNIDS
Computational Model, and the design of the LLNIDS Hybrid used in this research
including the Invisible Mobile Network Bridge (IMNB), the SOM component, the
FIS component, the Svensson and Josang (SJ) Fusion component, and the AIS
Danger Theory component. Chapter 4 continues with the implementation and
results of the hybridized SOM/FIS/AISDT aspects of the system, including new
dynamic procedures. Chapter 5 discusses the significance of this research, and
Chapter 6 is the conclusion.
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CHAPTER 2—BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE

This research proposes a nearly complete overhaul of how intrusion
detection research is viewed and accomplished from types, to a data
computational model, Soft Computing methods, and an overall diagnostic
system. This chapter provides background, review of the literature, and state of
the art information for each of the initial issues of this research, including types of
intrusion detection, data preparation, feature reduction, clustering and
classification, the intrusion detection problem, and Soft Computing intrusion
detection methods including Self-Organizing Maps (SOM), Fuzzy inference
Systems (FIS), and Artificial Immune Systems Danger Theory (AISDT). No other
known work covers a similar comprehensive diagnostic system for intrusion
detection.

TYPES OF INTRUSION DETECTION
Intrusion detection is the process of identifying and responding to
malicious activity targeted at computing and networking sources [2]. Over the
years, types of intrusion detection have been labeled in various linguistic terms,
with often vague or overlapping meanings. Not all researchers have used the
same labels with the same meanings. To demonstrate the need for consistent
labeling of intrusion types, previous types of intrusion detection are listed below
in order to show the variety of types of labeling that have been used in the past.
Denning [3] in 1986 referred to intrusion detection methods which included
profiles, anomalies, and rules. Her profiling included metrics and statistical
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models. She referred to misuse in terms of insiders who misused privileges.
Young in 1987 [4] defined two types of monitors: appearance monitors
and behavior monitors, the first performing static analysis of systems to detect
anomalies and the second examining behavior.
Lunt [5] in 1988 referred to the misuse of insiders; the finding of abnormal
behavior by determining departures from historically established norms of
behavior; a priori rules; and using expert system technology to codify rules
obtained from system security officers. A year later, in 1989, Lunt mentioned
knowledge-based, statistical, and rule-based intrusion detection. In 1993, she
referred to model-based reasoning [6].
Vaccaro and Liepins [7] in 1989 stated that misuse manifests itself as
anomalous behavior. Hellman, Liepins, and Richards [8] in 1992 stated that
computer use is either normal or misuse. Denault, et al, [9] in 1994 referred to
detection-by-appearance and detection-by-behavior. Forrest, et al, [10] in 1994
said there were three types: activity monitors, signature scanners, and file
authentication programs.
Intrusion detection types began converging on two main types in 1994:
misuse and anomaly. Crosbie and Spafford [11] defined misuse detection as
watching for certain actions being performed on certain objects. They defined
anomaly detection as deviations from normal system usage patterns. Kumar and
Spafford [12] also referred to anomaly and misuse detection in 1994. Many other
researchers, too numerous to mention them all, have also referred to misuse and
anomaly as the two main types of intrusion detection, from 1994 up to the
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present time.
However, other types of intrusion detection continue to be mentioned.
Ilgun, Kemmerer, and Porras [13] in 1995 referred to four types: Threshold,
anomaly, rule-based, and model-based. Esmaili, Safavi-Naini, and Pieprzyk [14]
in 1996 said the two main methods are statistical and rule-based expert systems.
Debar, Dacier, and Wespi, [15] in 1999 referred to two complementary
trends: (1) The search for evidence based on knowledge; and, (2) the search for
deviations from a model of unusual behavior based on observations of a system
during a known normal state. The first they referred to as misuse detection,
detection by appearance, or knowledge-based. The second they referred to as
anomaly detection or detection by behavior.
Bace [16] in 2000 described misuse detection as looking for something
bad and anomaly detection as looking for something rare or unusual. MarinBlazquez and Perez [17] in 2008 said that there are three main approaches:
signature, anomaly, and misuse detection.
While descriptive, these various labels over time are inconsistent and do
not favor an analytical discussion of network intrusion detection. Not all of them
are necessary, they are not mutually exclusive, and as individual groups they
have not been demonstrated as being complete. Rather than arbitrate which of
these labels should be used and how they should be defined, new labels have
been created to describe types of local network intrusion detection in a manner
which favors an analytical environment. These new types are explained in the
Methodology section of this paper.
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DATA PREPARATION
Data selection begins with manual feature selection and many strategies
have been used. Lunt‘s [18] features included bad login attempts, amount of
network activity by type and host, and number of times each account was
accessed. Cannady [19] used the protocol, source port, destination port, source
address, destination address, ICMP type, ICMP code, data length, and raw data.
A standardized vector of 41 elements resulted from a data set produced in
1998 by MIT‘s Lincoln Laboratory under DARPA sponsorship and was listed by
Kayacik, Zincir-Heywood, and Heywood [20]: duration of the connection,
protocol, service, flag, source bytes, destination bytes, land, wrong fragment,
urgent, hot, failed logins, logged in, number of compromised conditions, root
shell, su attempted, number of root accesses, number of file creation operations,
number of shell prompts, number of operations on access control files, number of
outbound commands in an ftp session, is hot login, is guest login, count of
connections, service count, SYN errors, service SYN errors, REJ errors, service
REJ errors, same service rate, different service rate, percent of connections to
different hosts, count of connections with same destination host, count of
connections with same host and service, percent of connections having the same
destination host and service, percent of different services on same host, percent
of connections to the host having the same source port, percent of connections
to the same service coming from different hosts, percent of SO errors for host,
percent of SO errors for host and service, percent of RST errors for host, and
percent of RST errors for host and service. See that paper for more detailed
information on these features.
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Lee and Heinbuch [21] in 2001 experimented with SYNs received, SYNs
dropped, SYN-ACKs sent, number of new connections made, number of queued
SYNs at end of the last window, number of queued SYNs at end of this window,
queued SYNs timed out, maximum number of connections open, FIN-ACKs sent,
FIN-ACKs received, resets sent, resets received, number of connections closed,
number of source sockets for received data packets, number of destination
sockets for sent packets, number of destination ports for received packets, and
number of source ports for sent packets.
Mukkamala, Janoski, and Sung [22] in 2001 assigned weights to
commands, such as 1 to exit and 10 to chown, and determined the average and
highest weight for a user. Web related data was also examined, such as the
number of 404 errors.
Term frequency inverse document frequency (tf-idf) for text categorization
in relation to intrusion detection was discussed by Zhang and Shen [23] in 2005.
LaRoche and Zincir-Heywood [24] in 2006 presented a vector for wireless
intrusion detection consisting of the subtype of the frame, the destination
address, the sender address, the BSSID of the access point, the fragment
number, the sequence number, and the channel.
Livadas et al. [25] in 2006 added network information such as the
maximum initial congestion window, who initiated the flow, percentage of packets
pushed in a flow, variance of packet inter-arrival time for flow, and variance of
bytes-per-packet for flow.
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FEATURE REDUCTION
Feature reduction means to reduce the amount of input data in order to
reduce the resources needed for analysis. It can also be called feature selection
and feature ranking. The original feature reduction must be done by a
knowledge engineer who determines what the first input data is going to be from
the possibly huge amount of data that is available. The data can be
computationally reduced later, usually in reference to reducing the number of
elements in an input vector. Feature reduction is needed especially for Soft
Computing methods because they typically access the data repeatedly, such as
during a training process, and using a full data set can be computationally
prohibitive.
Mukkamala, Sung, and Abraham in 2004 [26] explained that a complete
analysis of feature ranking would require

experiments to examine all

possibilities, analyzing two variables at a time, then three variables at a time,
etc., and would still not be infallible because the available data might be of poor
quality.
Mukkamala and Sung in 2002 [27] proposed this feature reduction
algorithm which was implemented after an Artificial Neural Network (ANN) was
trained:
1. Delete one input feature from the (training and testing) data.
2. Use the resultant data set for training and testing the classier.
3. Analyze the results of the classier, using the performance metrics.
4. Rank the importance of the feature according to the rules.
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5. Repeat steps 1 to 4 for each of the input features.
Using OA for Overall Accuracy, FP for False Positive rate, and FN for
False Negative rate, these are the rules which were used to rank the importance
of the features:
1.

If OA increases and FP decreases and FN decreases, then the
feature is unimportant.

2.

If OA increases and FP increases and FN decreases, then the
feature is unimportant.

3.

If OA decreases and FP increases and FN increases, then the
feature is important.

4.

If OA decreases and FP decreases and FN increases, then the
feature is important.

5.

If OA does not change and FP does not change then the feature
is secondary.

Sung and Mukkamala in 2003) [28] identified features with Support Vector
Machines (SVM) and ANN. Abraham and Jain in 2004 [29] based feature
reduction on the contribution the input variables made to the construction of a
decision tree.
Chen, Abraham, and Yang in 2005 [30] proposed a Flexible Neural Tree
(FNT) for feature reduction following this mechanism:
1.

Initially the input variables are selected to formulate the FNT
model with same probabilities.

2.

The variables which have more contribution to the objective
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function will be enhanced and have high opportunity to survive in
the next generation by an evolutionary procedure
3.

The evolutionary operators provide an input selection method by
which the FNT should select appropriate variables automatically.

An evolutionary feature reduction method was proposed by Chimphlee et
al. in 2005 [31] which was followed by fuzzy clustering.

CLUSTERING VS. CLASSIFICATION
Clustering is the unsupervised division of unlabeled sets into subsets, and
classification is the supervised determination of the labeled subset to which an
element belongs. In intrusion detection, for example, clustering would ideally
consist of the unsupervised dividing of all computer usage into subsets which
would put intrusions into some subsets and normal traffic into other subsets.
Classification would then be the determination of which subset some new
computer usage belongs: intrusion or normal.
Clustering can be done by Evolutionary Computing (EC), Fuzzy
Reasoning, Swarm Intelligence, and Self-Organizing Maps (SOM), as well as by
other methods. SOM generally both clusters data and also classifies it. Other
Soft Computing methods generally classify.
Newsome, Karp, and Song in 2006 [32] explained how to thwart clustering
and classification: 1) inseparability attacks to blur distinctions between classes;
and, 2) red herring attacks to create false classifications.
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THE INTRUSION DETECTION PROBLEM
Intrusion Detection on a high level is an intractable problem with some
aspects of it being unsolvable. This has been proven and illustrated many ways.
Cohen noted in 1987 [33] (Page 31) that the determination of a virus was
undecidable: ―In order to determine that a program 'P' is a virus, it must be
determined that P infects other programs. This is undecidable since P could
invoke the decision procedure 'D' and infect other programs if and only if D
determines that P is not a virus.‖ He also noted that tracing exact information flow
requires NP-Complete time. Cohen listed these specific problems as being
undecidable:


Detection of a virus by its appearance



Detection of a virus by its behavior



Detection of an evolution of a known virus



Detection of a triggering mechanism by its appearance



Detection of a triggering mechanism by its behavior



Detection of an evolution of a known triggering device



Detection of a virus detector by its appearance



Detection of a viral detector by its behavior



Detection of an evolution of a known viral detection

Other researchers have confirmed the difficulty of the problem. Using
misuse to mean all kinds of badness with a scale of 0 (normal) to 1 (misuse),
Helman, Liepins, and Richards in 1992 [8] showed that expert systems are NPHard. Me in 1998 [34] used a genetic algorithm to manipulate vectors based on
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event counts, and said the problem was NP Complete.
These researchers described it linguistically. (Intrusion Detection) Rules
need to be maintained and managed. This process is labor-intensive and errorprone. [35] Signature-based network intrusion-detection systems (NIDS) often
report a massive number of simple alerts of low-level security-related events. [36]
(Page 1) It is common for a NIDS (Network IDS) to raise thousands of alerts per
day, most of which are false alerts. [37] (Page 1)
Here are some more colorful ways of illustrating the intrusion detection
problem. It is an arms race where one side advances and then the other side
advances, ad infinitum. It is a treadmill where the researcher figures out a way to
detect the latest kind of intrusion, the intrusion changes, and the researcher does
it again, ad infinitum. As a general summary, a detection method can exist for
every kind of intrusion and an intrusion method can exist for every kind of
detection. It is an evolutionary system where both sides continually evolve to
outwit the other side. Cohen [33] (Page 34) compared this situation to an old
western saying: ain’t a horse that can’t be rode, ain’t a man that can’t be
throwed.

SOFT COMPUTING AND INTRUSION DETECTION
One of Cohen‘s [33] (Page 30) conclusions from the intrusion detection
problem above was this leaves us with imprecise techniques. This overall
difficulty with intrusion detection leads to Soft Computing for solutions. Although
the proper term Soft Computing was initiated by Zadeh in the early 1990‘s [38],
some components of Soft Computing are much older: Bayes probability was
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published in 1763 [39]; Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) was published in 1943
[40]; and, Fuzzy Sets was published in 1965 [41]. Soft Computing is called soft
in order to contrast it with hard computing, i.e., exactness. Some characteristics
of Soft Computing include probability, randomness, inexactness, and biological
attributes. Soft Computing has similarities with Artificial Intelligence (AI), but AI
researchers have traditionally used hard computing. An additional occasional
characteristic of Soft Computing is emergence [42]. Many refer to this
characteristic as being a Black Box, described as a device where something
goes in and something comes out, but what happens inside the box cannot be
seen. Soft Computing is not really a Black Box---researchers write the software
code for it and know exactly what is inside the box. However, results emerge
from this code in ways which often cannot be readily understood. The graphical
SOM map in this research addresses that problem. Other characteristics of Soft
Computing are tractability, robustness, low solution cost, and tolerance for
imprecision and uncertainty [43]. Soft Computing has been further described as
―aimed at an accommodation with the pervasive imprecision of the real world‖, as
well as to ―exploit the tolerance for imprecision, uncertainty and partial truth to
achieve tractability, robustness, low solution cost and better rapport with reality‖,
and ―the role model for Soft Computing is the human mind‖ [44] (Page 1).
These characteristics of Soft Computing are summarized here as being
the Imprecision Principle:
Some labor intensive, error-prone, biological, evolutionary,
incomplete, inconsistent, impossible, un-scalable, unsolvable,
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undecidable, complex, ambiguous, non-intuitive, and/or intractable
problems are best resolved with imprecise, probabilistic, fuzzy,
inexact, emergent, non-intuitive, uncertain, and partially true
methods which are designed largely by the intuition, judgment, and
experience of knowledge engineers.
Billions of network packets are continually being created on the Internet
and it is impossible for the network security analyst to know the reason for every
single one of these packets being sent by routers, switches, appliances,
programs, and users from all over the world. This network traffic, from an
analyst‘s point of view, contains imprecision, uncertainty, and partial truths,
meaning that decisions must routinely be made from incomplete information.
Soft Computing thus provides a coping mechanism for network security tasks
that otherwise would be impossible.
Extensive research has been done on using Soft Computing for intrusion
detection and [45] examines the state of the art in this field. Ten general Soft
Computing components stand out in intrusion detection research: Artificial
Immune Systems (AIS), Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), Bayes Reasoning,
Decision Trees (DT), Dempster-Shafer (D-S), Evolutionary Computing (EC),
Fuzzy reasoning, Hidden Markov Model (HMM), Self-Organizing Maps (SOM),
and Swarm Intelligence.
Soft Computing generally refers to the hybridization of these components,
for example ANN with Fuzzy. Three general types of hybridization are possible:
consecutive, ensemble, and interactive.
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Figure 1, Types of Hybridization
Figure 1 illustrates three types of hybridization. The first type is
consecutive in which the output of one method is the input of the next method.
This can continue in a series larger than two methods. The second type of
hybridization is ensemble in which two or more methods are implemented in
parallel and the results are fused. The third type of hybridization is interactive in
which two or more methods interact with each other in some way, such as a loop,
before they produce a single output. Complex hybridizations with combinations
of these types are also possible.
These methods of data fusion have been researched for ensemble
hybridization. Averaging, voting, or using the maximum value was suggested by
[22]. A positive result if any of the interim results is positive [46]. These methods
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were proposed by [47]: Bayes Average, Bayes Product, Dempster-Shafer,
Recognition, Substitution, and Rejection Rates (RSR), the Predictive Rate
Method (PRM), and Rogova‘s Class Level Method. This method was proposed
by [48] for four interim results: Let the four interim results be
each of the four parallel methods. Then, let
determined. Find

for

be the final result which is to be

such that

is

minimized. Although not called fusion, a subjective logic method of correlation of
intrusion alarms was explained by [49] and the Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA)
fuses a series of four inputs into a contextual output [50].

Figure 2, Complex Hybridization
Figure 2 illustrates an example of complex hybridization. The overall
layout is an ensemble which consists of consecutive methods 1 and 2, Method 3,
and interactive methods 4 and 5. The three interim results in Figure 2 are fused
for a single output. The complex nature of intrusion detection favors hybridized
methods because a single method cannot cover all of the possibilities and
intricacies involved in discovering all kinds of intrusion attempts.

19
A study of existing Soft Computing intrusion detection strategies was
published in [45]. Numerous examples of hybridized combinations of methods
were noted in this paper, but comprehensive direct comparisons of methods are
not feasible because of the many different kinds of intrusions, criteria, and
variables which were used in setting up test environments. Not all researchers
used the same variations of methods—many different types of ANN were
evaluated, for example. The statistical relevance of the results of the
comparisons is not known. One clear winner in testing, though, was the
ensemble hybridization method [51] because it can use diverse approaches in
parallel. Compare this with medical tests in which the patient might get blood
tests, an electrocardiogram, x-rays, and a urinalysis in parallel with the results
from these tests all going to a physician who fuses the data into a diagnosis.

Self-Organizing Maps (SOM)
The research for this paper began as an experiment with SOM to see if it
would cluster Storm Worm intrusions from firewall logs. The experiment was
successful and was published in [52] and [53], (see for details). This SOM was
later called 1D ANNaBell, for a one dimensional ANN that rang a bell for alerts.
A SOM is a type of Artificial Neural Network (ANN), but the structure of a SOM is
significantly different from a feed forward and back propagation ANN. Both have
nodes (neurons), but in a classical ANN the nodes are connected in such a way
that data are manipulated while conceptually flowing through the node structure
resulting in an answer, whereas in a SOM the nodes represent clusters in space
which are conceptually pulled like rubber over the data, which can result in a
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representational visual display of the data. The original ANN was created by
McCulloch and Pitts in 1943 [40]. SOM was conceived by Kohonen in 1982 [54]
and is sometimes called a Kohonen Network. A SOM can represent
multidimensional data in a smaller dimensional space, like shining light on a
three-dimensional object to create a two-dimensional shadow. Hexagonal SOM
maps have been used to display high dimensional data in a more human
understandable format.
A SOM primarily clusters the data, but it can also classify data by finding
the nearest node in space, called the Best Matching Node (BMN). A visual
display can be produced, but is not always necessary. The visual display for 1D
ANNaBell is not very useful, but the node data of 1D ANNaBell can be used by
scripts to produce intrusion detection alerts. The graphics were improved with a
newer version called 3D ANNaBell which was published in [55], [56], and [57],
which see for detailed information.
Other researchers have also studied SOM for intrusion detection.
Hoglund and Hatonen in 1998 [58] constructed a SOM prototype for visualization
of anomaly detection with a hex map based on user account logs (CPU times,
characters transmitted, and blocks read). A grey-scale U-matrix scheme showed
the relative distances between the nodes and highlighted the clusters of data.
(See Ultsch and Siemon [59] for a description of U-matrix.)
Lichodzijewski, Zincir-Heywood, and Heywood in 2002 [60] described how
to do a hierarchy SOM with time series data, and Kayacik, Zincir-Heywood, and
Heywood in 2003 [61] created a hierarchical hex SOM with TCP data. A 475-

21
node SOM was produced by Ramadas, Ostermann, and Tjaden in 2003 [62]
based on network traffic.
Excellent demonstrative graphics were provided by Vicente and Vellido in
2004 [63] for a growing hierarchical SOM; Tauriainen in 2005 [64] described a
robust SOM for detecting P2P activity; and, Wetmore, Zincir-Heywood, and
Heywood in 2005 [65] proposed dynamic subset selection in order to train SOMs
much more quickly.
Kayacik and Zincir-Heywood in 2006 [66] described a method of labeling
nodes in a U-matrix hex map to clarify the meanings of resulting maps.
Payl Over SOM for Intrusion DetectiON (POSEIDON) finessed an IDS by
using SOM instead of payload length for preprocessing classification as
explained by Bolzoni, Etalle, and Hartel in 2006 [67] and Bolzoni and Etalle in
2008 [68].

Fuzzy Inference Systems (FIS)
Fuzzy inference is a classifier that helps to cope with inexact descriptions
of intrusions where the Imprecision Principle applies. Network indications of a
P2P botnet might be, for example, that a local computer has contacts with a large
number of external IP addresses, the packet size entropy is high, a wide range of
destination ports is used with many high-numbered ports, and the UDP ratio is
high.
Luo in 2000 [69] refined an algorithm for mining fuzzy association rules,
defined the concept of fuzzy frequency episodes, and presented an original
algorithm for mining fuzzy frequency episodes, noting that security itself includes
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fuzziness. Degrees of attack guilt were outlined by Noel, Wijesekera, and
Youman in 2002 [70] which can be used for Fuzzy inference: Absolute
innocence, probable innocence, possible innocence, possible guilt, probable
guilt, and provable guilt.
Fuzzy IDS (FIDS) was proposed by Tillapart, Thumthawatworn, and
Santiprabhob in 2002 [71] as a framework for network intrusions, including SYN
and UDP floods, Ping of Death, E-mail Bomb, FTP and Telnet password
guessing, and port scanning. Numerous example rules are provided in the paper.
Cougarr-based IDS (CIDS) utilized a Fuzzy Inference System in the
Decision Agent [72]. Cougarr stands for cognitive agent architecture and is open
source software available at http://www.cougarr.org (8/2/2009).
Rule-Based Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (RBFCM) were developed by Wang
and Daniels in 2008 [73] to deal with causal relations for evidence graphs and
hierarchical reasoning in network forensics.
Su, Yu, and Lin in 2009 [74] proposed using fuzzy association rules for
incremental mining so that a real-time IDS can be implemented with this method.
In Association Based Classification (ABC), Tajbakhsh, Rahmati, and
Mirzaei in 2009 [75] used fuzzy c-means for clustering and fuzzy association
rules for classification.

Artificial Immune Systems Danger Theory (AISDT)
Using the generation of T cells in the Biological Immune System (BIS) as
a basis for detecting computer viruses was proposed by [10] in 1994. Strings
were randomly generated, some of which matched protected data and
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represented self. Other strings did not match protected data and represented
non-self. The strings which matched protected data (self) were dropped, while
the remaining strings were used somewhat like T cells and were compared with
the protected data. In a process called negative selection, a match of a non-self
string with protected data indicated that a change in the protected data had
occurred, indicating an intrusion. This would later be called an Artificial Immune
System (AIS).
After evaluating AIS for network intrusion detection, Kim [76] in 2001
noted that the size of data which defines self and non-self is enormous; the
system could not manage to generate a single valid detector after one day; over
600,000 detectors would be required; and, it would take over 1,000 years to
generate that many detectors. He concluded that AIS had a severe scaling
problem.
Matzinger in 1994 [77] had proposed a new viewpoint of the human
immune system called Danger Theory, which emphasized the recognition of
danger instead of self/non-self. Examples of danger in this context are tissue
destruction, temperature, and an abnormally released molecule from a cell.
Danger Theory was applied to AIS by Aickelin [78] in 2002 with a
suggestion to use it for computer security. He noted that negative selection is
imperfect resulting in false positives being inevitable; that the self/non-self
boundary is blurred; and, that self changes over time. With the qualification that
negative selection is important, he noted the following seven considerations for
AIS Danger Theory:
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1. An Antigen Presenting Cell (APC) is required which can present a
danger signal.
2. Danger in AIS Danger Theory just means something interesting,
such as in data mining, and does not necessarily refer to actual
danger.
3. A Danger Signal can be positive or negative (no danger).
4. A spatial Danger Zone needs a measure of proximity, such as
distance or time.
5. A Danger Signal itself should not lead to further Danger Signals.
6. Priming killer cells via APCs in spatially distributed models might be
relevant.
7. Examples of other considerations are how many antibodies should
receive signals from a given APC; and, Danger Theory relies on
concentrations, not binary matching.
He also noted that Danger Theory had quite a number of elements and
might need to be altered for AIS.
In relation to computer security Anomaly Detection, Aickelin [78] noted
that when a detector (T cell) is activated, it is reported to a human operator who
decides if there is a true anomaly. If so, then the detector becomes a memory
(persistent) detector. He noted that scaling is a problem in AIS: …it becomes
more and more problematic to find a set of detectors that provides adequate
coverage whilst being computationally efficient. He adds that Danger Theory
assists in the scaling issue: It restricts the domain of non-self to a manageable
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size, removes the need to screen against all self, and deals adaptively with
scenarios where self (or non-self) changes over time. He suggested these as
possible Danger Signals in computer security:


Too low or too high memory usage



Inappropriate disk activity



Unexpected frequency of file changes as measured for example by
checksums or file size



SIGABRT signal from abnormally terminated UNIX processes.



Presence of non-self.

Powers and He in 2008 [79] proposed a hybrid AIS/SOM system, but their
AIS component was without Danger Theory. The AIS results were fed into a
SOM for classification.
Fu in 2008 [80] used a clustering algorithm of the data to represent tissue
in an AIS system so that changes in this tissue could produce danger signals.
Each cluster represented a cell, which had mass, age, and a location.
A method inspired by dendritic cells was proposed by [81] in 2008
suggesting excessive CPU load, frequency of file changes, bandwidth saturation,
and abnormal rates of e-mail communications as sources of danger signals.
Dasgupta and Niño wrote a comprehensive review of AIS, including
Danger Theory, in 2009 with a section on computer security [82]. Wu and
Banzhaf reviewed AIS, including Danger Theory, and other computationally
intelligent methods in 2010 [83] noting that most of the algorithms were tested on
benchmark datasets, but that real-world environments are far more complicated;
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that the scaling problem needs to be overcome; and, that current AIS algorithms
oversimplify their counterparts in immunology.
Kulis, et al, in 2011 [84] proposed a fuzzy dendritic cell algorithm with
access to memory as an adaptation to AIS Danger Theory to reduce the amount
of antigens sampled in order to improve runtime costs.
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CHAPTER 3 – METHODOLOGY AND COMPONENTS

A comprehensive methodology was developed which overhauled
concepts of intrusion detection including a new model of intrusion detection types
created in order to facilitate analytical research in this area; a computational
model created in order to lay a foundation for data analysis; and, a hybrid system
composed of an Invisible Mobile Network Bridge (IMNB), a Self-Organizing Map
(SOM), a Fuzzy Inference System (FIS), Svensson and Josang (SJ) Fusion, and
Artificial Immune System Danger Theory (AISDT). A subsection for each of
these concepts follows.

LLNIDS TYPES OF INTRUSION DETECTION
Historical descriptions of types of intrusion detection have been
inconsistent and have not favored an analytical discussion of network intrusion
detection. Not all of the historical labels of types are necessary, they are not
mutually exclusive, and as individual groups they have not been demonstrated as
being complete. Rather than arbitrate which of these previous labels should be
used and how they should be defined, new labels have been created to describe
types of local network intrusion detection in a manner which favors an analytical
environment.
These new types are explained below, but first some terminology needs to
be stated in order to later describe the types. An Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) is software or an appliance that detects intrusions. A Network Intrusion
Detection System (NIDS) is an appliance that detects an intrusion on a network.
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In this research, network means a landline network. Local network intrusion
detection refers to the instant case of network intrusion detection.

Figure 3, A Local Landline NIDS
Figure 3 illustrates the location (in yellow) of a Local Landline Network
Intrusion Detection System (LLNIDS) as used in this research. It is an IDS on a
landline between a local network and the Internet. The point of view of this
research is from inside the LLNIDS. Users on the local network may have other
ways of accessing the Internet that bypass the LLNIDS, such as wireless and
dialup. This research is restricted to the LLNIDS as described here.
Examples of detection which are not Local Landline Network Intrusion
Detection (LLNID) include detection on the host computer, detection by someone
else out on the Internet, or detection by someone out in the world, such as a
perpetrator bragging in a bar. This research concerns LLNID and the new types
described in this paper refer to LLNID. A network intrusion in this context means
one or more transmissions across the network that involves an intrusion. A
single Internet transmission is often called a packet. Therefore, using this
terminology, the physical manifestation of an intrusion on a network is one or
more packets, and intrusion detection is the detection of these packets that
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constitute intrusions. Intrusion detection research needs a model of types of
intrusions and types of intrusion detection that benefits analysis of methods. This
research focuses only on LLNID. These are the proposed types of intrusions for
the special case of local landline network intrusion detection that facilitate
intrusion detection research analysis in the LLNID context:


Type 1Intrusion: An intrusion which can be positively detected in
one or more packets in transit on the local network in a given time
period.



Type 2 Intrusion: An intrusion for which one or more symptoms
(only) can be detected in one or more packets in transit on the local
network in a given time period.



Type 3 Intrusion: An intrusion which cannot be detected in
packets in transit on the network in a given time period.

These three types of intrusions are necessary for analytical research in
order to indicate and compare kinds of intrusions. A positive intrusion is different
than only a symptom of an intrusion because immediate action can be taken on
the first whereas further analysis should be taken on the second. Both of these
are different than intrusions which have been missed by an LLNIDS. To show
that these three types are mutually exclusive and are complete for a given time
period, consider all of the intrusions for a given time period, such as a 24-hour
day. The intrusions which were positively identified by the LLNIDS are Type1
intrusions. Of the remaining intrusions, the ones for which the LLNIDS found
symptoms are Type 2. Here the hypothesis is that the LLNIDS can only find an
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intrusion positively or only one or more symptoms are found. No other results
can be returned by the LLNIDS. Therefore, the remaining intrusions are Type 3,
which are intrusions not detected by the LLNIDS. No other types of intrusions in
this context are possible.

Figure 4, Types of Intrusions for LLNIDS
Figure 4 is a diagram that illustrates the types of intrusions as described
above. An intrusion is either Type 1, Type 2, Type 3, or it is not an intrusion.
Those were the types of intrusions. Next are the types of intrusion
detection. There are three types of network intrusion detection that correspond
to the three types of intrusions in the LLNID context:


Type 1Network Intrusion Detection: A Type 1 Intrusion is
detected in a given time period.



Type 2 Network Intrusion Detection: One or more symptoms
(only) of a Type 2 Intrusion are detected in a given time period.



Type 3 Network Intrusion Detection: No intrusion is detected in a
given time period.

Admittedly, Type 3 is not a detection but the lack of detection. It is
included because these three types of detection correspond to the three types of
intrusions and Type 3 Intrusion Detection facilitates analysis of intrusion
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detection methods. Examples of Type 3 Intrusion Detection are nothing was
detected; no attempt was made at detection, an intrusion occurred but was not
detected by the LLNIDS; and, no intrusion occurred. All of these have the same
result: there was no detection of an intrusion by the LLNIDS.
Each of the three network intrusion detection types is necessary to
describe all of the types of intrusion detection. A positive detection of an
intrusion is different than just a symptom of an intrusion because a positive
detection can be immediately acted upon while a symptom indicates that further
analysis is needed. Both of these are different than intrusions that are missed by
network intrusion detection. To show that these types are mutually exclusive and
complete for a given time period, consider an LLNIDS looking at network packets
for a given time period, say a 24-hour day. For all packets that the LLNIDS
determines positively indicates an intrusion the LLNIDS has accomplished Type
1 intrusion detection. Of the remaining packets, for each packet that the LLNIDS
determines is a symptom of an intrusion the LLNIDS has accomplished Type 2
intrusion detection. The remaining packets represent Type 3 intrusion detection.
These three types of network intrusion detection are complete in this context
because they cover all possibilities of intrusion detection. In common language,
Type 1 is a certainty, Type 2 is a symptom, and Type 3 is an unknown.
Those were types of intrusion detection. Next are types of methods and
alerts. LLNID methods can be defined in terms of the three intrusion types:


Type 1NID Method/Alert: A method that detects a Type 1 Intrusion
and an alert that indicates a Type 1Intrusion.
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Type 2 NID Method/Alert: A method that detects a symptom of a
Type 2 Intrusion and an alert that indicates a symptom (only) of a
Type 2 Intrusion.



Type 3 NID Method/Alert: A method that does not exist, thus
there is no alert.

These types of methods and alerts are necessary to differentiate that
some methods are positively correct, other methods only indicate symptoms of
intrusions, and some methods do not exist. They are mutually exclusive because
a local method either positively indicates an intrusion (Type 1), it only detects a
symptom of an intrusion (Type 2), or it does not exist (Type 3). They are
complete because there are no other types of methods in this context.
Those were types of methods and alerts. Next are types of false
positives. The term false positive generally has meant that an intrusion detection
system has sent a false alarm. False positives are generally undesirable
because the false positive rate of intrusion detection systems can be high and
can use up a lot of seemingly unnecessary, and limited, resources. However,
with these new types, the concept of a false positive is different for different
intrusion detection types in the LLNIDS context.


Type 1False Positive: A Type 1 Method produces an alarm in the
absence of an intrusion.



Type 2 False Positive: A Type 2 method produces an alarm in the
absence of an intrusion.



Type 3 False Positive: Does not exist because no alarm is
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produced.
A Type 1 False Positive indicates a problem with the type 1 method which
should be corrected. Type 2 False Positives are expected because Type 2
Methods do not positively detect intrusions, they only detect symptoms of
intrusions. There is no Type 3 False Positive because no detections and alerts
are produced for Type 3 Intrusion Detections. These types of false positive are
necessary because they each indicate separate network intrusion detection
issues. Type 1 is a network intrusion detection problem which needs to be
corrected and Type 2 is expected. The two types of false positive are mutually
exclusive and complete because only Type 1 Network Intrusion Detection can
produce a Type 1 False Positive and only Type 2 Network Intrusion Detection
can produce a Type 2 False Positive. No other types of false positives in this
context are possible. Since Type 1 and Type 2 of local network intrusion
detection methods are mutually exclusive, these are also mutually exclusive.

Figure 5, Types of Intrusion Detection for LLNID
Figure 5 is a Venn diagram which illustrates types of intrusion detection in
the LLNIDS context. The horizontal line separates intrusions at the top from nonintrusions at the bottom. A Type 1 detection is in the upper left of the circle if it is
actually an intrusion or it is in the lower left of the circle if it is a false positive. A
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Type 2 detection is in the upper right of the circle if it is actually an intrusion or it
is in the lower right of the circle if it is a false positive. Everything outside of the
circle is Type 3 detection whether it is an intrusion or not.
This typing system allows illustration that empirically most intrusion
detection is not Type 1 (positive detections), but Type 2 (symptoms of
detections), and Type 3 (missed detections). This differentiation is essential in
proceeding in a scientific way for improved intrusion detection.
Previously labeled types of intrusion detection do not fit neatly into these
three new types. Misuse detection, for example, in some cases could indicate a
definite intrusion and would then be Type 1, or it could indicate only symptoms of
intrusions in other cases and would then be Type 2. The comparison of false
positives of different methods of Misuse Detection is an invalid technique unless
Type 1 methods are compared only with Type 1 methods and Type 2 methods
are compared only with Type 2 methods. Anomaly detection, for example, would
tend to be Type 2, but some anomalies could clearly indicate intrusions and
would be Type 1. Type 1 and Type 2 methods of Anomaly Detection should be
separated before making any comparisons. Likewise with intrusion detection
labels based on activity, appearance, authentication analysis, behavior,
knowledge, models, profiles, rules, signature, static analysis, statistics, and
thresholds. These are still useful as descriptive terms, but they are not as useful
in analyzing methods of determining whether or not an intrusion has occurred
because they allow the comparisons of apples and oranges in numerous ways.
The labels Type 1 and Type 2 give us more analytical information: either an

35
intrusion has occurred or else only a symptom of an intrusion has occurred.
Type 3 intrusions tell us that we should find out why an intrusion was not
detected in the network traffic so that we can create new rules to find more
intrusions in the future. Previously labeled types of intrusion detection do not
give us as much analytical information as do types 1, 2, and 3.
Using this system, one can clearly state objectives of LLNID research in a
new way which was previously only implied. The significance of given time
period is apparent in the descriptive of these objectives because the objectives
are stated in terms of progress from one time period to another time period.
Here are specifics for LLNID research:


Type 3 NID Research: Find ways of detecting intrusions that are
currently not being detected, moving it up to type 2 or 1 intrusion
detection.



Type 2 NID Research: Improve Type 2 Intrusion Detection with
the goal of moving it up to Type 1 Intrusion Detection.



Type 1NID Research: Improve Type 1 Intrusion Detection so that it
is faster, uses fewer resources, and has fewer false positives.

Each of these types of research are necessary because finding new
methods of intrusion detection is different than improving symptom detection
which is different than making Type 1 Intrusion Detection more efficient. They
are also complete because there are no other types of intrusion detection
research in this context.
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Table 1, Summary of LLNID Types
Type 1

Type 2

Type 3

This can be positively
detected by LLNIDS

A symptom of this
can be detected by
LLNIDS

This is not
detected by LLNIDS

This detects one or
more symptoms
(only) of an intrusion

An intrusion is not
detected

Method

How to positively
detect an intrusion

How to positively
detect a symptom of
an intrusion

An intrusion is not
detected

Alert

This positively signifies
an intrusion

This signifies a
symptom of an
intrusion

This does not occur

False
Positive

An alert positively
signifies an intrusion,
but there is no
intrusion

An alert signifies a
symptom of an
intrusion, but there
is no intrusion

An alert does not
occur

Research

Improve Type 1
Intrusion Detection,
such as by increasing
the speed of detection,
using less resources,
and having fewer false
positives

Improve Type 2
Intrusion Detection
so that it becomes
Type 1 Intrusion
Detection

Detect Type 3
intrusions so that
they become Type
2 or Type 1

Intrusion

Intrusion This positively detects
Detection an intrusion

Table 1 summarizes the types discussed in this section. These are some
ways of how researchers can use these types: research that compares false
positive rates of Type 1 methods with false positive rates of Type 2 methods is
not valid because Type 1 methods are not supposed to have false positives
whereas Type 2 methods are expected to have false positives. Discounting
Type 3 intrusion detection because of the amount of time taken may be irrelevant
if otherwise the intrusion would not be found, at all. Proposing that intrusion
prevention will replace intrusion detection is a false claim so long as types 2 and
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3 intrusions continue to exist. Rather than disregarding Type 2 methods,
research should attempt to fuse the results of Type 2 methods in order to move
them up to Type 1.

THE LLNIDS COMPUTATIONAL MODEL
The proposed Local Landline Network Intrusion Detection System
(LLNIDS) Computational Model covers intrusion detection data from packet
analysis to sophisticated Soft Computing methods. The LLNIDS Computational
Model begins with a transmission of digital network traffic and proceeds stepwise
to higher concepts. The terminology for the input data changes depending upon
the level of the concept. The lowest level concept in this research is the network
transmission, which is a series of bits called a frame or a packet. Frame refers to
a type of protocol, such as Media Access Control (MAC), which is used between
two neighboring devices, where the series of bits are framed by a header at the
start and a particular sequence of bits at the end. Packet refers to many types of
protocols, such as Internet Message Control Protocol (ICMP), User Datagram
Protocol (UDP), and Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). A packet is used for
hops between numerous devices, such as Internet traffic. The length of the
series of bits in a packet is often indicated at certain locations in the headers of
the packets. A frame passes a packet between two neighboring devices, where
another frame passes the same packet between the next two devices, and
subsequent frames keep passing the packet forward until the journey of the
packet is concluded. Since frames and packets are variable lengths, they are
represented by a set of objects which represent the various elements of
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information inside the frame or packet.
A Transmission ( ) consists of a set of objects ( ) representing elements
of information in that transmission.

(1)
where

. Examples of objects in a transmission are the source MAC

address, IP address, and port; the destination MAC address, IP address, and
port, the direction of the traffic, protocols used, flags set, sequence numbers,
checksums, type of service, time to live, fragmentation information, and the
content being sent.

Figure 6, A Sample Packet
Figure 6 is a sample packet as displayed by tcpdump [85]. Header
information extracted from the packet is displayed across the top. The leftmost
column is the byte count in hexadecimal. The packet itself is displayed in
hexadecimal in columns in the middle. Character representations of the
hexadecimal code, when possible, are shown on the right. The packet is a
transmission set, , with variable length objects as elements. Example object
elements for this set are the protocol, UDP, and the destination port, 16402, both
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of which have been extracted from the packet code.
If an intrusion occurs on a local landline, it occurs in one or more , so
LLNID means inspecting ‗s for intrusions. Not all of the available data in

has

equal relevance to intrusion detection and the reduction of the amount of data is
desirable in order to reduce the resources needed for analysis. This process has
been called feature deduction [86], feature reduction [86], feature ranking [87], or
feature selection [86]. The first feature selection must be done manually by a
knowledge engineer, after that the features can be ranked and/or reduced
computationally. Soft Computing methods often use data structures of n-tuple
formats, such as one-dimensional arrays, sets, vectors, and/or points in space.
Since sets can be used as a basis to describe these data structures, the next
step in the computational model is to convert features of T into higher levels of
sets which can be further manipulated for data analysis. The next set to be
considered is an Event ( ) which consists of a set of elements ( ) obtained from
the objects of , and which changes the concept level from a transmission of
objects to a set of elements:

(2)
where

and the following condition is also met:

(3)
How to construct

from the objects of

is feature selection--elements

should be selected which can detect intrusions. The Imprecision Principle
applies to feature selection and experimentation is appropriate. An example of
possible elements for an event is the source IP address, the destination IP
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address, the source and destination ports, the protocol, and the size of a packet
crossing the network.
Table 2, A Sample Event
UDP

231.240.64.213

238.87.208.113 16402

Table 2 shows a sample event with the following elements: The protocol
is UDP, the source IP address is 231.240.64.213, the destination IP address is
238.87.208.113, and the destination port is 16402. These elements were object
elements in the sample transmission set shown above. The process of pulling
data objects from a packet and saving them as Event elements is called parsing
the data.
The next step is to add Meta-data ( ), if appropriate, about the event
consisting of meta-data elements ( ):

(4)
where

. Meta-data is data about data. In this context, it means data

about the transmission that is not inside the transmission, itself. Examples of
meta-data are the time when a packet crossed the network, the device which
detected the packet, the alert level from the device, the direction the packet was
travelling, and the reason the packet was detected. The concept level has
changed from a set of elements to a set of meta-data about the set of elements.
Table 3, Sample Meta-Data
20100916

00:14:54

FW

Table 3 shows sample meta-data for an event. The meta-data in this table
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is the date, 20100916, and the time, 00:14:54, at which an appliance detected
the transmission, and a label for the appliance that detected the packet, FW.
A Record ( ) of the event includes both the event, itself, plus the metadata:

(5)
An example of a record is an entry in a normalized firewall log. The
concept level has changed from a set of meta-data to a set that includes both the
elements and meta-data about those elements. In practice, the meta-data
typically occurs in

before the elements to which the meta-data refers.
Table 4, A Sample Record

20100916 00:14:54

FW

UDP

231.240.64.213 238.87.208.113 16402

Table 4 is a sample record, which consists of meta-data and elements
from the previous examples for

and . Before proceeding to the next step, the

attributes of R for a given analysis should be in a fixed order because they can
later become coordinates in a location vector. Processing the data into fixed
orders of attributes is called normalizing the data.
A Log ( ) of records is a partially ordered set:

(6)
An example of a log is a file containing normalized firewall log entries. An
infinite-like log could be live streaming data.
Table 5, A Sample Log
20100916 00:14:54
20100916 00:14:56
20100916 11:14:57

FW
FW
FW

UDP
TCP
ICMP

231.240.64.213 238.87.208.113 16402
216.162.156.85 198.18.147.222 40833
90.29.214.20
198.18.147.221 41170
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Table 5 shows a sample log. It is like the sample record, above, except
there are three entries instead of just one entry. The concept level has changed
from a set of meta-data and elements to a collection of sets of meta-data and
elements. L can be considered to be a set of vectors; L can also be considered
to be a matrix. If L is a text file, each line of the file is one location vector and the
entire file is a matrix, changing the concept level to a matrix.
If the features have been selected successfully, an intrusion, or one or
more symptoms of it, should be able to be detectable in . Therefore, LLNIDS
intrusions and intrusion detection can be defined in terms of
the universal set of
Intrusion. Then

and let

and . Let R be

represent a set of R that describe a Type 1

is the set:

(7)
Formula 7 formulates a Type 1 Intrusion. Examples of Type 1 intrusions
are a Ping of Death and a get request to a known malicious web site. These
intrusions can potentially be prevented.

has the same attributes as L in that it

can be considered to be a set of location vectors or it can be considered to be a
matrix. As matrices, the number of columns in
the same, but the number of rows in
below, let

and L for an analysis must be

and L can be different. For reference

be the universal set of all Type 1 intrusions. The concept level for

has changed from a matrix to a set of matrices. That was about intrusions. Now
here is the function for Type 1 Intrusion Detection,

:
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(8)

{

Formula 8 is the function for Type 1 Intrusion Detection, which returns
True if an intrusion has been detected, otherwise it returns False. Next is Type 2
intrusions and intrusion detection. In most cases, one or more events occur
which makes the security technician suspicious that an intrusion has occurred,
but more investigation is necessary in order to reach a conclusion. This
scenario, which is Type 2 Intrusion Detection, is similar to a patient going to a
physician, who looks for symptoms and then makes a decision about whether or
not the patient has a medical problem. The security technician also looks for
symptoms and then makes a decision about whether or not an intrusion has
occurred. Let R be the universal set of

and let

represent a set of

describes one or more symptoms of a Type 2 Intrusion. Then

that

is the set:

(9)
Formula 9 formulates a Type 2 Intrusion. Let

be the universal set of all

Type 2 intrusions. Now here is a formula for Type 2 Intrusion Detection,

{
The

:

(10)

function returns True if a symptom of an intrusion has been

detected; otherwise it returns False. Possible examples of Type 2 intrusions are
the following: The set of records consisting of a single local source IP address
and numerous unique destination addresses all with a destination port of 445; the
set of records consisting of a local IP address sending numerous e-mails during
non-working hours; and, the set of records consisting of high volumes of UDP
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traffic on high destination ports to a single local IP address matching criteria set
by a Self-Organizing Map. Like a cough does not necessarily indicate a cold, the
detection of an intrusion symptom does not always indicate an intrusion.
That was Type 2 intrusions and intrusion detection. Next is Type 3
intrusions, which are not detected in a given time period. Let R be the universal
set of

and let

represent a set of

that describes a Type 3 Intrusion. Then

is the set:

(11)
is the universal set of all

. A Type 3 Intrusion is not detected:

(12)
As a summary, compare these three types of intrusion detection in a
medical context to typhoid fever, which is spread by infected feces. Type 1
intrusion detection (prevention) is to wash one‘s hands after using the toilet; Type
2 intrusion detection is to recognize the symptoms, such as fever, stomach ache,
and diarrhea; Type 3 detection is represented by Typhoid Mary, who had no
readily recognizable symptoms.
The next step involves changing the data formats from R and L into forms
which can be directly manipulated by analysis software. (Packet analysis can
already occur directly on T.) This involves converting records into vectors and
logs into matrices. This conversion is straightforward with a Detailed Input Data
Vector,

, which starts as a set and is then used later as a location vector:

(13)
More feature reduction can occur at this step. If the order of each element
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in the set is fixed, i.e., if the order of the attributes of the set are fixed, then the
set can become a location vector. An example of

as a set is {1280093999,

10.3.4.10, 10.3.4.12, 445, TCP} which could indicate a time stamp in seconds, a
source IP address, a destination IP address, a destination port, and a protocol.
Converting IP addresses to numerical formats, and assigning a numerical label to
TCP, the same example of

as a location vector could be (1280093999,

167969802, 167969804, 445, 6).
Aggregate elements are also possible for a given time period, such as
aggregate data for each local IP address for a day. Examples of such aggregate
elements are the total number of R for the local IP address, the count of unique
source IP addresses communicating with the local IP address, and the
percentage of TCP network traffic for the local IP address. Many other types of
aggregate elements are possible. The Imprecision Principle applies and
experimentation is appropriate. These aggregate elements can be converted to
an Aggregate Input Data Vector,

, with

being an aggregation function:

(14)
where

. Again, the order of the attributes of the set are fixed so that the

set can become a location vector. An example of

as a set is {20100725, 428,

10.3.4.10, 48, 0.89} which could indicate that on 7/25/2010 428 unique source IP
addresses attempted to contact destination IP address 10.3.4.10 on 48 unique
destination ports with the TCP protocol being used 89 percent of the time. The
date and IP address become a label for the location vector when the location
vector is created. From the same example above, the location vector for IP
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address 10.3.4.10 on 7/25/2010 is (428, 48, 0.89).
Both of these types of sets/vectors can be generalized as a General Input
Data Vector, V :

(15)
The next concept level is to generalize V so that it can be used as input to
a wide variety of Soft Computer and other methods. The generalized elements
of V are be represented by e. V is an n-tuple of real numbers which can be
perceived, depending upon how it is intended as being used, as being a set, a
location vector, or a matrix:

{

Set:

}

(16)

Vector:

(17)
[

Matrix:

]

(18)

. For example, if the elements of V are an n-tuple of the real

where

numbers 0.6, 0.5, 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, and 0.1, then V can be perceived as being a set,
a vector or a matrix:

Set:

(19)

Vector:

(20)

Matrix:

[

]

(21)

An Input Data Matrix, D, is a collection of similar types of V: Here D is
represented as a set of V :

(22)
where

. D is on the same concept level as L—each can be considered to

be sets of location vectors or a matrix. Here is how D can be represented as a
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matrix:

(23)
[
where

and

]

.

For example, given these three location vectors, each represented as a
matrix,

[

]

(24)

[

]

(25)

[

]

(26)

D would be represented this way as a matrix:

[

]

can refer to an Input Data Matrix consisting of
an Input Data Matrix consisting of
1.

(27)

and

can refer to

. D can also be one of these three types:

refers to a data set which is used to train the software
intelligence.

2.

refers to a data set which is used to test the software
intelligence.

3.

refers to feral data.

D can be used in virtually an infinite variety of analysis methods, from
spreadsheet methods to statistics and data mining, to machine learning methods.
For example,
then classify

can be used by clustering software which, after testing, would
for intrusion detection.
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The LLNIDS Computation Method more accurately defines information
security concepts and scientifically ties components of information security
together with structured and uniform data structures. The LLNIDS can be
extended to describe existing and potential methodologies of analysis methods
including statistics, data mining, AIS, NeuroFuzzy, Swarm Intelligence, and SOM,
as well as Bayes Theory, Decision Trees, Dempster-Shafer Theory, Evolutionary
Computing, Hidden Markov Models, and many other types of analysis.

DESIGNING THE HYBRID
Soft Computing components can be combined in virtually an infinite
number of ways to create hybrid methods. The historical work of researchers
has shown that different methods are better for different types of intrusions—
there is no one winner take all method. The Imprecision Principle applies so that
experimentation and intuition is appropriate. A general ensemble design which
applies numerous methods at once appears to be the best solution. The LLNIDS
Types of Intrusion help to focus the design on specific objectives, and the
LLNIDS Computational Model provides a methodology of processing the data.
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Figure 7, Hybrid Design
Figure 7 illustrates a framework of some of the uncountable possibilities of
hybridization. Starting from the left, input data can come from one or numerous
sources, including firewall logs, system logs, network flow data, packet analysis
systems, and tcpdump. For each data source the data can be preprocessed
(normalized) many different ways for the initial analysis. For each type of
normalization, many alternative methods are possible for each additional step in
the process from feature reduction to clustering, to training, and to classification.
Several different methods are also possible for fusing the data. The overall
number of possibilities is too great to try them all at once.

THE INVISIBLE MOBILE NETWORK BRIDGE (IMNB)
The Invisible Mobile Network Bridge (IMNB) was selected for data
collection because it provided more information than firewall logs but was not as
overwhelming as network flow data. ANNaBell used firewall logs as input with 20
million entries per day being typical. Network flow data would contain more
information, but would be based on approximately 2 billion entries per day, an

50
amount more difficult to process. Host data cannot be trusted because
experience has shown that current malware can exist outside of the operating
system and can control intrusion detection software on the host. This research
proposes a new source of network data produced from a device that is close to,
but not located on the host, and that produces complete, but not an
overwhelming amount, of information: an Invisible Mobile Network Bridge
(IMNB).
The illustrations below show a laptop computer configured as an IMNB.
Invisible means that the laptop has no IP address and is invisible on Layer 3 of
the network. Mobile means that any computer or subnet traffic can be redirected
through the laptop in real time without rebooting or reconfiguring any computers,
routers, or switches. The laptop bridge can also remain running while Ethernet
cables are physically switched and network traffic is redirected through it. The
laptop bridge can then use various kinds of packet analysis software, such as PF
[88], tcpdump [85], Snort [89], and Wireshark [90] to analyze the network traffic
being redirected through it. This data can also be normalized as input vectors for
more sophisticated analysis methods such as ANNaBell.

Figure 8, IMNB Desktop Insertion
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Figure 8 shows the basic bridge setup with a laptop configured as the
invisible mobile bridge. A blue cable is plugged into an extra NIC in the side of
the bridge. The computer to be analyzed is the desktop which is connected to
the Internet and running a YouTube [91] video. The Internet cable is unplugged
from the desktop and plugged into the back of the mobile network bridge. The
unplugged end of the blue cable is then plugged into the back of the desktop.
The network connection is maintained and all of the desktop‘s network traffic is
now travelling through the laptop configured as the invisible mobile network
bridge. The YouTube video keeps running as though nothing has changed. The
laptop can now capture network data and, after the intelligent software has been
trained, act as an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) doing all types of analysis on
the data, from packet sniffing to statistics, data mining, computational
intelligence, and Soft Computing. Think of it as being like a heart monitor which
is taking an EKG to show the health of the network connection.

Figure 9, IMNB Subnet Insertion
Figure 9 shows how the mobile bridge can analyze an entire subnet by
rearranging switch cables. The pink cable (circled in left photo) originally goes
from the switch out to the Internet. By plugging this pink cable into the back of

52
the laptop, and by plugging the blue cable from the laptop into the switch,
network traffic for the entire subnet is redirected through the laptop acting as a
network bridge. A YouTube video runs uninterrupted during the process, and
users of the subnet need not even be aware that a change has been made. The
laptop bridge can programmatically watch only certain computers on the network,
if desired, or can also act as an IDS. Think of it as being like a heart monitor
taking the EKG of all of the computers on the subnet at the same time. The
bridge can be placed in network areas with the greatest potential impact.

Figure 10, Basic IMNB Scenario
Many scenarios for using the mobile bridge are possible, and Figure 10
shows the main idea. A mobile bridge is placed as a man in the middle between
a computer and the Internet, where it collects network data on the computer.
This data can be observed on the mobile bridge in real time as it is being saved.
See Figure 8 for a photograph of this scenario. The Mobile Bridge is mobile
because this can be done many times with different computers with various
scenarios (see more scenarios below), all without turning the mobile bridge or
any of the computers off. The collected data is later transferred, by any of
various ways, to a support computer, which then uses the data to train and test
one or more modules containing various methods of computational intelligence
and/or Soft Computing. The trained and tested modules are then transferred
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back to mobile bridges, which then become intrusion detection systems using the
trained and tested modules.

Figure 11, IMNB Symbolic Division of Labor
A summary of this division of labor is shown in Figure 11 as three simple
steps: (1) one or more mobile bridges capture the data; (2) one or more support
computers use the data to train and test intelligent software modules; and, (3) the
modules are then used on mobile bridges for intrusion detection. The reason
that separate support computers are needed is because the training can be
lengthy and computationally intensive. Once the intelligent software modules are
trained, though, they can be quickly and easily used by mobile bridges for realtime intrusion detection.

Figure 12, IMNB Forensics Scenario
Live on-the-spot forensics can be quickly accomplished simply by
switching cables. The mobile bridge can also be inserted between a known
infected computer and a simulated network as in Figure 12 for two major
accomplishments: (1) the mobile bridge can capture network information from

54
known infected computers without endangering other computers on the Internet;
and, (2) the mobile bridge can examine the network traffic of infected computers
for forensics value. The first accomplishment is particularly noteworthy because
the packet analysis can be used to create rules for Type 1 and/or Type 2
intrusion detection, and also because the network traffic of known infections can
be used to train and test the intelligent software modules.

Figure 13, IMNB Subnet Scenario
The mobile bridge can also be placed behind a network switch (or hub) in
order to collect data on, and monitor, an entire subnet as illustrated in Figure 13.
The mobile bridge can be inserted live while the network is active simply by replugging cables. The mobile bridge could alternatively take a sample of each
computer in turn to take a closer look at each one.
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Figure 14, IMNB WAN Scenario
The mobile bridge can also be placed in a Wide Area Network (WAN) as
shown in Figure 14. The only limitation is the hardware capability of the mobile
bridge in terms of bandwidth, storage, and processing capability. The mobile
bridge could alternatively cycle through each subnet or each computer for more
detailed analysis.

Figure 15, IMNB Jack Scenario
The mobile bridge can capture and monitor the traffic visible on a jack (an
Ethernet wall plugin) as shown in Figure 15. Among other things, this scenario
can tell if a switch port for a jack is properly limiting the traffic to that jack.
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Figure 16, IMNB Task Distribution
The tasks are distributed as in Figure 16. Capturing must be done by a
mobile bridge at the location of a computer or subnet. Converting and
normalizing the data can be accomplished by either a mobile bridge or a support
computer. The processing power of a support computer must be used to train
the intelligent software modules. Classification of new data, i.e., intrusion
detection, must be done by a mobile bridge on site. Further various types of
analysis, such as fusion of intrusion alerts, can be done by either a mobile bridge
or a support computer.

THE SOM COMPONENT
Since past history can be an indication of future performance, this
research used a SOM based on ANNaBell as one of the components to be
hybridized. The Imprecision Principle applies and intuition and experimentation
are appropriate. Neural computing such as SOM is appropriate for data, such as
network traffic, which is noisy and ill-defined [54].
SOM uses Hebbian [54] competitive learning which uses neighborhoods
of nodes. The SOM input training data is not labeled, so the learning is
unsupervised---the SOM clusters the data with no indication of what the data
represents.
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The SOM nodes have location vectors which must have the same number
of dimensions as the input data. As previously discussed, the input data can be
perceived on many levels, from a network transmission, to a set of elements, to a
set of meta-data about the set of elements, to both the set of elements and metadata about those elements, to a collection of sets of meta-data and elements, to
vectors, to sets of vectors, to a matrix. Referring to the LLNIDS Computation
Model discussed above, the input data is

and for SOM D is perceived as being

a matrix. Each row of D is a V and every V will have the same size

, which is

also the number of columns in D. Note that each V is commonly called a vector
even though each V is also conceptually a row in the matrix D.
Each node in the SOM has the same structure as V in the input data-specifically, each node has

elements each of which is in the set of real

numbers--and all of the nodes together in the SOM form a matrix which has the
same number of columns as D. Since one of the objectives of SOM is to reduce
the representation of the data space in the input data, the number of rows in the
SOM matrix should be less than the number of rows in D. Let
location vector for a node in the SOM so that

represent a

is analogous to V and let

represent the data matrix of all of the node location vectors in the SOM so that
is analogous to D. To easily differentiate between input data and node data,
input data is designated
vector is

and node data is designated

and a node vector is

. The comparison of

. Likewise, an input
and

is as follows:
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(28)
[

]
(29)

[
where
SOM (

,

,

, and

]
. Each node location vector in the

) may be initially created randomly or pseudo-randomly from

the domain of V from

or from

. Initiating the SOM means to assign these initial

values to the nodes.

BMN and Distances
The SOM methodology has three phases: training, testing, and
production. The training phase uses nodes to cluster the training data; the
testing phase tests the clusters with test data; and, the production phase
classifies feral data using the clusters. The concept of a Best Matching Node
(BMN) is central to SOM, both for clustering and classification. The Best
Matching Node is sometimes called the Best Matching Unit or the image. BMN is
also sometimes called winner take all, except this is not technically correct
because neighbors of the winner also share in the take. This is explained further
below.
For BMN, the concept level changes to a multidimensional solution space
and each of the location vectors indicate a point in this solution space. The
training phase of the SOM clusters node vector points in multidimensional space
with each node typically representing a cluster. The nodes are typically also
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clustered, resulting in clusters of clusters. The classification phase finds the
BMN for a new input vector, thus indicating the cluster in multidimensional space
which is closest to the new input location vector.
A distance measure is needed to determine the clusters and BMN in
multidimensional space. Examples of possible distance measures are Euclidean
distance and Manhattan distance. This research uses Euclidean distance,
represented in this formula by d :
√

[ ]

[ ]

[ ]

[ ]

[ ]

[ ]

(30)

where x is the number of dimensions. The next formula uses the function
a distance measure to determine the BMN,

, for

as

:

Another kind of distance is also used in SOM which designates a
neighborhood of nodes. Both types of distance are necessary in training the
SOM. The SOM neighborhood is a topological configuration that is determined
by the knowledge engineer before the SOM is trained. The Imprecision Principle
applies to the determination of the configuration, which relies on the judgment of
the knowledge engineer. The rational for the specific configuration for this
research is explained further below.

Figure 17, Neighborhood of Nodes
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Figure 17 illustrates the SOM neighborhood for a sample configuration as
a graph in three different ways. The concept level has changed from points in
multidimensional space to a topological graph. The vertices of the graph
represent the nodes of the SOM and the edges of the graph represent neighbors
of the nodes. The first illustration, on the left, shows the topological configuration
of 9 nodes in a rectangular format. Node 1, for example, has the neighbors 2
and 4. Node 5 has the neighbors 2, 4, 6, and 8. A neighborhood distance in a
SOM is the number of edges between two nodes in the topological configuration.
It is the number of hops, or hop count, using the edges between nodes. The
neighborhood distance in the topological graph is different than the vector point
distances in multidimensional space. Both of these two different types of
distances are needed for the training of a SOM.

Figure 18, Neighborhood Distances
Figure 18 shows the neighborhood distances between all of the nodes
depicted in Figure 17. This can easily be verified by counting the edges between
the nodes in the left graph of Figure 17. The middle graph of Figure 17 uses the
same topological configuration as the left graph, but physically places the nodes
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in two-dimensional space as though the node location vectors were created at
random. It is possible in the middle graph of Figure 17, and in an actual SOM,
for the vector points of two neighboring nodes to be far apart in the solution
space. Nodes 2 and 5 in the middle graph of Figure 17, for example, are
neighbors, yet their vector points are the furthest apart in space. Node location
vectors change during training, and the right graph in Figure 17 shows an
example representation of how a SOM neighborhood might appear after training:
while not evenly spaced, the vector points of neighbor nodes tend to be relatively
near each other. Note that the neighborhood distances in all three graphs in
Figure 17 are the same, even though the vector points of the nodes have moved
in space. Many other kinds of neighborhood configurations are possible besides
the one shown in Figure 17. The neighborhood of the BMN means all of the
nodes, including the BMN, within a given neighborhood distance of the BMN.
The neighborhood size refers to the given neighborhood distance. For example,
a neighborhood size of 2 means all of the nodes 2 edges or fewer away from the
BMN, including the BMN, itself. A neighborhood size of 0 would consist only of
the BMN. A neighborhood size begins large and shrinks during the training of
the SOM.
The SOM is trained by repeatedly adjusting the locations of the node
vectors as the neighborhood size gradually becomes smaller. Each

in

is considered in turn and all of the nodes in the current neighborhood of the BMN
for the instant

are moved in vector space towards that

. The distance each

node is moved, , for each iteration of training is determined by the distance
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measure,

, and a training factor, , which is explained below. The formula

for how far to move a node for each input vector for each iteration of training is as
follows:

(31)

{

BMI and the Training Factor
Training factors can be determined many ways [54]. In this research, the
training factor is determined at times by the number of Best Matching Inputs
(BMI) in the current neighborhoods. BMI are the counterpoint to a BMN. If the
BMN for a

is

, then that

is one of the BMI for that

. Note that BMN is

referred to in this paper as being singular because there is only one BMN at a
time, while BMI are referred to as being plural because there can be more than
one best matching input at a time, even though the actual count of BMI might be
0 or 1. BMI have a many-to-one correspondence with a BMN.

Figure 19, Best Matching Inputs
Figure 19 illustrates the many-to-one correspondence in an example with
six input vectors (BMI) and three node vectors (BMN). An input vector always
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has 1 BMN, but a node can have 0, 1, or more BMI. Here are the Best Matching
Nodes for each input vector and the Best Matching Inputs for each node based
on the Figure 19 example:

Table 6, BMN and BMI
Input Vector BMN
1
2
2
2
3
1
4
2
5
2
6
2

Node BMI
1
3
2 1,2,4,5, and 6
3
(None)

Table 6 shows the Best Matching Nodes and Best Matching Inputs from
the example in Figure 19. Referring to the table, the Best Matching Node for
input vector 1 is 2, while the Best Matching Inputs for Node 2 are 1, 2, 4, 5, and
6. The number of BMI for a node is important in the calculation of . Let
represent the count of BMI for Node i. Then in the example in Table 6, |
,|

|

, and |

|

|

.

The number of BMI for a neighborhood is also important. The previous
illustration was for the number of BMI for a node, the next illustration is for the
number of BMI for a neighborhood. First, the neighborhood for the example
needs to be configured.

Figure 20, Neighborhood Example
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Figure 20 shows a possible neighborhood configuration in order to
continue the example from Figure 19. In this configuration, nodes 1 and 2 have a
neighborhood distance of 1; nodes 2 and 3 have a neighborhood distance of 1;
and, nodes 1 and 3 have a neighborhood distance of 2. Let

represent

the neighborhood of Node i with a neighborhood size of s for training iteration
(time) t. (Since multiple training iterations can be used for each neighborhood
size, and the count of BMI can change between iterations, the iteration also
needs to be indicated.) Then

represents the count of all of the BMI in

that neighborhood for that iteration. For example, continuing the example from
figures 19 and 20, for the current iteration

because the

neighborhood for Node 3 with a neighborhood size of 1 includes nodes 2 and 3
and the total number of BMI for nodes 2 and 3 is 5.
Table 7, Counts of Neighborhood BMI

Node 1
Node 2
Node 3

1
5
0

6
6
5

6
6
6

Table 7 continues the example from figures 19 and 20 by showing all of
the counts for all of the possible neighborhood sizes for each of the nodes. This
table shows, for example, that the count for Node 3 with a neighborhood size of 0
is 0, with a neighborhood size of 1 is 5, and with a neighborhood size of 2 is 6.
The next important measure used in the calculation of

is the maximum

count of BMI in the neighborhoods for a given neighborhood size.

Let

represent this measurement for the neighborhood size s and
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training iteration t. Referring to Table 7, the maximum count for a neighborhood
distance of 0 is 5, the maximum count for a neighborhood distance of 1 is 6, and
the maximum count for a neighborhood distance of 2 is 6.

(32)
The training factor

is calculated from

and is as follows:

(33)

A characteristic of determining the training factor this way is that BMN and
BMI assignments must be determined during or prior to the first training iteration.
One way of doing this is to have the initial neighborhood size include all of the
nodes in the SOM. Keeping track of each BMN and the count of the BMI is also
a way of tracking the progress of the training of the SOM: a slowing rate of
change in these measurements is an indication of progress in the training of the
SOM. Again, this is how the training factor is used in the SOM:

(34)

{

And this is how the change in the node vector is used in the training for
one input vector for one iteration of training:

(35)
An epoch is one iteration of training for the SOM. An epoch consists of
looking at each of input vectors

, finding the BMN

adjusting the neighborhood node vectors

for that vector, and

appropriately as described in

the formulas above. If there are 65,536 input vectors, for example, as was the
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case in ANNaBell, then one epoch consists of finding the BMN and adjusting the
BMN neighborhood vectors for each of the 65,536 input vectors.
The knowledge engineer must determine how many epochs should be
used to train the SOM, which is an Imprecision Principle issue. This can be
decided in advance or it can be determined dynamically by monitoring changes
in the movement of the nodes during the training. Deciding this in advance for
large datasets is risky for a couple of reasons: 1) the training can last for days
and one may not know when the training will end; and, 2) the nodes can move
back and forth during training without converging on a solution.

Neighborhood Sizes
Another issue is determining what the neighborhood sizes will be for each
epoch. The knowledge engineer determines the original (largest) neighborhood
size for the first epoch, then the neighborhood sizes can get progressively
smaller down to a neighborhood size of 0 for the last epoch. This can be done at
a fixed rate for a fixed number of epochs, or it can be done dynamically. The
dynamic method monitors node movement for successive epochs until the nodes
acceptably converge. Then, the neighborhood size is reduced, and the further
epochs are run until the nodes acceptably converge, again. This is repeated until
the nodes acceptably converge at a neighborhood size of 0. What constitutes
acceptable convergence is subject to the Imprecision Principle. Indications of
convergence are the average amount of movement of the nodes for an epoch,
the largest single movement of a node during an epoch, and the amount of
change in BMI between two successive epochs. An issue to look for in
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convergence is nodes that repeatedly move back and forth without converging.
1D ANNaBell and 3D ANNaBell started with a neighborhood size
consisting of all of the nodes in the SOM. They could run a given number of
epochs at the same neighborhood size, saving the state of each epoch, and stop,
allowing the knowledge engineer to compare the states of successive epochs for
convergence. More epochs could be run at the same neighborhood size or at a
reduced neighborhood size, depending upon the appearance of convergence.
This continues until the knowledge engineer is satisfied of convergence at a
neighborhood size of 0. Here is the pseudo-code:
set epochs_to_run
set neighborhood_size
load previous state
for each epoch
calculate the training factor
for each input vector
find the BMN
move the BMN
move the BMN neighbors
save the state
Interpreting the Results
After training, the output of the SOM is in

, which contains the vector

locations of all of the SOM nodes. The interpretation of this output data is the
next major issue and this interpretation is subject to the Imprecision Principle.
Many ways exist of interpreting the SOM and in a large sense understanding the
SOM output is a data mining problem. One way is to graphically plot the
distances between neighboring nodes resulting in a display which shows clusters
of nodes. Another way is to call each dimension of the vectors a feature, and to
data mine relationships between features in the nodes of the SOM. The concept
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level has changed to features representing different dimensions of the vectors.
Yet another way is to label the types of input BMI per node and look for patterns
of these BMI. Each node can be labeled this way depending upon the types of
BMI that it has. In this research, for example, each input vector represents a
single local IP address. These input vectors can therefore be labeled with a type
of network user or usage, such as student, faculty, and staff users or desktop,
wireless, or server usage. Subnets representing departments can also be
labeled, as can individual computers. The result can be a fingerprint of the kinds
of activity for that department.

Figure 21, Fingerprint of a Department
Figure 21 plots yellow asterisks for IP addresses for a department on the
BMN vectors on the SOM topological map resulting in a fingerprint of the network
activity for that department. This profiling can be a model of risk or used as
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symptoms or danger signals. The labeled features on this map include the
percentage of UDP traffic, the total number of entries in a log file, the highest port
accessed, the lowest port accessed, the number of unique ports accessed, and
the number of unique source IP addresses in the traffic. The origin is the location
of the BMN for IP addresses with no log entries. The background color is a blend
of red, green, and blue colors for the intensities of some of the features.
From a node point of view, the BMI of a node might primarily represent
student computer activity, so that node could be labeled student. From a usage
point of view, the BMN vector can be located for the vector of each IP address in
a department.

Figure 22, ANNaBell Island
Figure 22 is an example of a higher level feature map, created with Art of
Illusion [92], from 3D ANNaBell. Landscape features such as valley, plateau,
and mountain, developed from the SOM nodes, represent types of network
traffic. The concept level has changed from features of vector dimensions to
landscape features representing groups of vector dimensions. The valley
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landscape feature, for example, consists of nodes with vector dimensions of very
low total number of log entries, low ratios of unique source IP addresses, very
high ratios of port ratios, medium low ports, high high ports and low UDP ratios.
Each small area of the feature map represents a node of the SOM based on the
topological map, and any IP address can be plotted on this map by locating its
BMN. The neighbors on the feature map are based on the topological map,
while the colors and elevations are based on intensities of vector elements. An
IP address with a BMN in the valley area, for example, indicates normal office
network traffic for that IP address. An IP address with a BMN in a mountainous
area, depending upon the specific location, might warn of dangerous network
traffic.
The testing of the SOM is a classification problem. New location vectors
from

are used to find the corresponding BMN for each and plot the location

on the feature map. Then, the kind of network traffic of the test vector is
compared with the kind of network traffic for the BMI of the BMN to see if they
are similar, or not. A test vector from a sample of malware, for example, should
have a BMN in a mountainous area, while a test vector from an office computer
should have a BMN in the valley. The results of the test should give some
indication of the reliability of the SOM. Since testing only compares each input
vector with each node once, it can be done extremely fast.
The SOM in production is also a classification problem. Vectors from feral
network traffic are matched with the corresponding BMN for each. If the BMN for
an input vector is in a dangerous area of the feature map, then an alarm, or
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danger signal, is produced. Since a SOM in production only compares each
input vector with each node once, it can be done extremely fast.
The 1D ANNaBell had a single node, 996, which indicated malicious or
vulnerable traffic, and which made alarms and follow up response
straightforward. That node is outdated, though, now, and so is no longer useful
for two reasons: the network traffic of Storm Worm changed, and other
computers with this characteristic were handled by incident responders until
there were none left. 3D ANNaBell had ambiguous areas of the feature map
which indicated danger areas, and so the alerts were not as straightforward.
This ambiguity led to a Fuzzy Inference System (FIS).

THE FIS COMPONENT
A Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) is a classifier that helps to cope with
inexact descriptions of data. This research adapts FIS to send danger signals
based on SOM results. A visual examination of ANNaBell Island shows 7
general areas on the map, but many of the boundaries of these areas are
indistinct.

Figure 23, Fuzzy Divisions of SOM Topological Map
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Figure 23 is a drawing of the 7 general landscape areas of ANNaBell
Island. These 7 areas represent different mixes of network activity involving
number of log entries, number of source IP addresses, ratio of UDP traffic and
other indicators. The IP addresses with malicious traffic, for example, have
tended to have a BMN in the Bot Hills area. The UDP Plains tend to represent
student computers—the IP address of any office computer with a BMN in the
UDP Plains area is suspect. Locating the BMN of an IP address on the map is
helpful in profiling computers, but the areas of the map are indistinct, so FIS
becomes beneficial in analyzing SOM output. 3D ANNaBell was converted into
FIS by observing the colorized nodes in the map to determine general areas, and
then by examining and comparing the intensities of the node vector values for
each dimension. The concept level has changed from landscape features to
fuzzy inference. The fuzzy values for the Traditional Valley, for example are total
entries, very low; ratio of unique source addresses, high; ratio of unique
destination ports, medium; lowest port, mixed; highest port, low; and, UDP ratio,
medium.
Table 8, 3D ANNaBell Fuzzy Values

Table 8 shows all of the fuzzy values for all seven landscape feature areas
of ANNaBell Island. These were determined by looking at the feature maps,
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getting the location vectors for the nodes in each area, and assigning fuzzy
values to the intensities of the values for each dimension for the nodes in each
area. If network traffic for an IP address had a high amount of entries, a low ratio
of source IP addresses, a low ratio of unique ports, a medium lowest port, a high
highest port, and a high UDP ratio, then that traffic would have a fuzzy match
with the traffic for BMI in the Bot Hills area of the feature map. In other words,
the network traffic had similarities to malware traffic.

Figure 24, Matlab Illustration
Figure 24 is a Matlab illustration of the fuzzy values of the ratio of unique
ports and the UDP ratio compared to the Bot Hills area of the feature map.
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Figure 25, Intensities of Features
Figure 25 shows the intensities for each of the dimension values for the
3D ANNaBell location vectors which were used to create Table 8. The
landscape feature overlays are derived from Figure 21 and are similar to the
drawing in Figure 23. Looking at the Traditional Valley area of each part of
Figure 25, for example, one can see that the total normalized is very low; the
source ratio is high; the port ratio is medium; the lowest port is mixed; the highest
port is low, and the UDP ratio is medium. Judgments of boundaries and
intensities may vary somewhat because of the Imprecision Principle. The
splotchiness of the intensities for d) Lowest Port indicate that this feature was not
very useful in determining relevant types of network traffic.
Fuzzy rules can be created from this information. Here is an example for
determining if a type of network traffic is similar to the type of traffic represented
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by the Bot Hills, in which case an alert should be produced:
IF
AND
AND
AND
AND
AND
THEN

Total Normalized is High
Source Ratio is Low
Port Ratio is Low
Lowest Port is Medium
Highest Port is High
UDP Ratio is High
Alert is High

Crisp output can be derived from the fuzzy inferences using Table 8.
Suppose, for example, that network traffic for a certain local IP address for a 24hour period had 1,574, 557 firewall log entries. Using the procedures for 3D
ANNaBell, this would be normalized to 0.779349187. Suppose these entries
came from 1,512,381 unique source addresses, which would be a 0.96051214
source ratio. Also, these entries targeted 956,961 unique ports, for a port ratio of
0.607765017. The lowest port attempted was 24,439 (0.372914079 normalized)
and the highest port attempted was 43,940 (0.670486862 normalized). The UDP
ratio was 0.546359486. The linguistic variables from Table 8 are Low (L), Very
Low (VL), Medium (M), Somewhat High (SH), High (H), Very High (VH), and
Extremely High (XH). Below are graphs illustrating how to get crisp output for the
data from this example. Sugeno-style inference is used in this example for
computational efficiency [93].
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Figure 26, Total Normalized Graph
Figure 26 shows the conversion to linguistic variables for the total
normalized dimension. The input is shown rounded to 0.779, which converts to a
fuzzy membership of 1.0 for Somewhat High; a fuzzy membership of 1.0 for
High; and, a fuzzy membership of 0.2 for Very High. The zero memberships are
not shown in the figure: Low, 0; Very Low, 0; Medium, 0; and, Extra High, 0.
These output values will be used further below.

Figure 27, Source Ratio Graph
Figure 27 shows the conversion for the source ratio dimension. The input
is shown rounded to 0.96. The non-zero outputs are Extra High, 0.95; and, High,
0.03.
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Figure 28, Port Ratio Graph
Figure 28 shows the conversion for the port ratio dimension with the input
shown rounded to 0.61. The single non-zero output is Medium, 1.0.

Figure 29, Lowest Port Graph
Figure 29 shows the conversion for the lowest port dimension with the
input shown rounded to 0.37. The non-zero outputs are Medium, 0.99; and, Low,
0.01.
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Figure 30, Highest Port Graph
Figure 30 shows the conversion for the highest port dimension with the
input shown rounded to 0.67. The non-zero outputs are Medium, 0.9; Somewhat
High, 0.62; High, 0.225; and, Very High, 0.02.

Figure 31, UDP Ratio Graph
Figure 31 shows the conversion for the UDP ratio dimension with the input
shown rounded to 0.546. The only non-zero output is Medium, 1.0.
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Table 9, Crisp Outputs

UDP Plains
Bot Hills
Plateau
Hi Port Mountains
Origin Basin
Traditional Valley
Port Cliffs

Total
Source Port Lowest Highest
Normalized Ratio
Ratio Port
Port
1.000 0.000 0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000 0.000 0.000
0.990
0.225
0.000 0.030 1.000
0.000
0.225
0.000 0.000 0.000
0.990
0.020
0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000 0.030 1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000
0.990
0.225

UDP Crisp
Ratio Output
0.000
0.167
0.000
0.369
0.000
0.209
0.000
0.168
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.338
0.000
0.203

Table 9 orders the outputs from the six previous graphs and displays the
calculated crisp outputs for each of the landscape features. Notice the similarity
of Table 9 with Table 8: they are the same except fuzzy memberships are
substituted for linguistic variables. Table 9 adds an additional column on the
right which shows the calculated crisp outputs. These crisp outputs are
determined with Sugeno-style inference where all of the weights are 1.0 for the
simplicity of illustration, which results in each crisp output simply being the
average of the values for each row. Since the linguistic variables overlap for the
various landscape features, the total of the crisp outputs do not necessarily add
up to 1.
The danger signals come from the crisp outputs, each of which can range
from 0 to 1. Since the Bot Hills is a known bad area, the crisp output for that
area, 0.69, is a danger signal. Safe signals are also possible. Since the Origin
Basin and the Traditional Valley are known safe areas, their crisp outputs of
0.000 and 0.338 are safe signals. The danger signals of the other landscape
areas depend upon the type of computer being evaluated. The crisp output of
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0.167 for the UDP plains, for example, would be a danger signal for an office
computer, but would not be relevant for a student computer. Ways of fusing
these danger signals to obtain a consensus are the subjects of the next two
topics: SJ Fusion and AISDT.

THE SJ FUSION COMPONENT
The most robust method for fusing intrusion alarms found in the literature
was a form of subjective logic explained by Svensson and Josang [49]. A portion
of that work concerns obtaining a consensus of possibly conflicting and uncertain
opinions. In order to maintain linguistic consistency, this consensus is called
fusion and this particular type of fusion is called SJ Fusion, for the authors of this
paper. All of the formulas in this section are from that source. Characteristics of
SJ Fusion are that it is based on belief theory operating on uncertain beliefs
about crisp propositions. It is appropriate for intrusion detection because an
intrusion either has taken place or it has not (it is crisp), and beliefs about an
intrusion can have varying degrees of certainty. In the current context, danger
signals have varying degrees of certainty. The concept level is changing from
crisp output from FIS, to uncertain danger signals of an intrusion. SJ Fusion will
be described, then the example from Table 9 will continue.
̅ be a state space containing x and its complement ̅ . In the

Let

current context, x represents an intrusion and ̅ represents the lack of an
intrusion. These variable names are pertinent in SJ Fusion:


b

Belief.



d

Disbelief.

Is the belief in x, from 0 to 1.
Is the disbelief in x, from 0 to 1.
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u

Uncertainty.

Is the uncertainty in the belief of x, from 0 to

1.


a

Atomicity.

Is the atomicity setting for x. Atomicity is a

variable to allow the knowledge engineer to manipulate uncertainty
in the output, from 0 to 1. The neutral setting is 0.5.
This restriction applies:

(36)
The combination of these variables is called the opinion of x and is the
tuple:

(37)
The probability expectation for the truth of x is:

(38)
One can see in the above formula how the atomicity a splits the probability
for uncertainty u. An atomicity value of 0.5 evenly splits the uncertainty
probability. The knowledge engineer sets the atomicity value and a value of 0.5
is used in this research.
Some of the crisp outputs for the landscape features in Table 9 support
the truth of an intrusion (danger) and some support the untruth of an intrusion
(safety). In all cases, The Bot Hills support the truth of an intrusion and the
Traditional Valley and Origin Basin support the untruth of an intrusion. The other
landscape features depend upon the type of computer, such as a student
computer, or an office computer, which is being evaluated. For an office
computer, the UDP Plains, Plateau, Hi Port Mountains, and Port Cliffs also
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support the truth of an intrusion. This information sets up the following SJ Fusion
opinions with numbers taken from the crisp output of Table 9:
Table 10, SJ Fusion Opinions
UDP Plains
Bot Hills
Plateau
Hi Port Mountains
Origin Basin
Traditional Valley
Port Cliffs

b
0.167
0.369
0.209
0.168
0.000
0.000
0.203

d
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.338
0.000

u
0.833
0.631
0.791
0.832
1.000
0.662
0.797

a
0.500
0.500
0.500
0.500
0.500
0.500
0.500

These varying opinions in Table 10 can not only be fused into a single
opinion, but can be done so with discounting. Suppose that for office computers
the UDP Plains, the Plateau, the Hi Port Mountains and the Port Cliffs are
indicators of danger, but not to the same extent as the Bot Hills are an indicator
of danger. These opinions can be discounted by opinions of opinions. Let A and

B be two agents where
provider and

is A‘s opinion of B as an advice
is B‘s opinion of x. Then,
is the discounted opinion such that:

1.
2.
3.
4.
The symbol

represents this operation so that

. This
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operation

is associative but not commutative so that in a chain of opinions,

the discounting can start at either end, but the order of opinions is significant. To
continue the example from Table 9, if the knowledge engineer‘s opinion of the
danger signals of the UDP Plains, the Plateau, the Hi Port Mountains and the
Port Cliffs is (0.5, 0, 0.5, 0.5), then the discounted danger signals of these
landscape features are:
Table 11, Discounted Opinions
UDP Plains
Plateau
Hi Port Mountains
Port Cliffs

b
0.084
0.105
0.084
0.102

d
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

u
0.917
0.896
0.916
0.899

a
0.500
0.500
0.500
0.500

A fused consensus can be made of the opinions using discounted
opinions when appropriate. Let

and

be opinions respectively held by agents
. Let
such that:

1.

{

2.

{

A and B and let
be the opinion
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3.

{

4.

{

Then,

is the consensus between

and

representing an

imaginary agent [A,B] ‘s opinion as if that agent represented both A and B. By
using the symbol

to designate this operator,

. This

consensus operator is both commutative and associative. The fusion/consensus
is done by starting with two of the landscape feature opinions to create an interim
consensus. A third landscape feature opinion is then fused with the interim
consensus to create a new interim consensus. This is repeated with each
additional appropriate landscape feature until a final consensus is reached.
Table 12, Office Computer Consensus
UDP Plains dis.
Bot Hills
Interim A
Plateau dis.
Interim B
Hi Port Mtn. dis.
Interim C
Origin Basin
Interim D
Traditional Valley
Interim E
Port Cliffs dis.

b
0.084
0.369
0.404
0.105
0.443
0.084
0.470
0.000
0.470
0.000
0.370
0.102

d
u
a
k
0.000
0.917 0.500
0.000
0.631 0.500 0.969
0.000
0.597 0.500
0.000
0.896 0.500 0.958
0.000
0.558 0.500
0.000
0.916 0.500 0.963
0.000
0.531 0.500
0.000
1.000 0.500 1.000
0.000
0.531 0.500
0.338
0.662 0.500 0.841
0.213
0.418 0.500
0.000
0.899 0.500 0.941

Consensus

0.399 0.204

0.399 0.500
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Table 12 shows the line-by-line calculated consensus for an office
computer for the example from Table 9, using discounted opinions where
appropriate. The significance of the office computer IP address designation is
that the opinions/danger signals from the UDP Plains discounted, Plateau
discounted, Hi Port Mountains discounted, and Port Cliffs discounted are
included in the consensus, which would not be the case for a student computer
IP address. The calculations were performed two lines at a time from top to
bottom. For example, the consensus for UDP Plains discounted and Bot Hills is
Interim A; the consensus for Interim A and Plateau discounted is Interim B; and
so forth, until the overall consensus is shown on the bottom line. One can follow
the changes as the interim danger signals, highlighted in bold red, are calculated
from the top down: 0.404, 0.443, 0.470, 0.470, and 0.370. The result for the
final consensus/danger signal is on the bottom line: 0.399—this is the fused
danger signal which is the output that is passed on to the Artificial Immune
System (AIS), covered in the next section. The calculation for a student
computer does not include the opinions of all of the landscape features because
students are allowed peer-to-peer activity, online gaming, and other activities
which are not appropriate for most office computers.
Table 13, Student Computer Consensus
Traditional Valley
Bot Hills
Consensus

b
0.000
0.369
0.279

d
u
a
k
0.338
0.662 0.500
0.000
0.631 0.500 0.875
0.244
0.477 0.500

Table 13 shows the consensus for the same example as though it were for
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the IP address of a student computer. The Origin Basin opinion/danger signal
was omitted because it had no effect in this example, having values of zero for
both belief and disbelief. Compare the final consensus/danger signal for the
office computer, 0.399 with the final consensus/danger signal for the student
computer, 0.279. They are different even though the same values were used
because student computers are expected to have more variety of network activity
than office computers.
The terminology changes somewhat going into the next section. Danger
Signal is used exclusively instead of consensus. The Danger Signal is the result
of the consensus for the beliefs of an intrusion, derived from the opinions taken
from the values for the landscape features. For clarification, the SJ fused Danger
Signal for the example of the office computer is 0.399 and the SJ fused Danger
Signal for the example of the student computer is 0.279. Whether these
numbers represent low or high levels of danger is not readily apparent. One way
of resolving this would be to derive many danger signals and compare them. Any
possible significance of the disbelief in danger in these examples is not apparent.
Also, suppose that Snort fired a low alert on the same IP address involved with
these danger signals. How would this Snort alarm be figured in? The Dendritic
Cell Algorithm (DCA) explained further below addresses these issues.

THE AIS DANGER THEORY COMPONENT
Danger signals from the SOM and FIS components integrate naturally into
Artificial Immune System Danger Theory (AISDT). AIS is based on the
exceedingly complex human immune system, which is summarized here only to
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the extent to provide some context for AISDT. Immunology is a developing and
controversial field of study in which experts sometimes define the same terms
somewhat differently. This paper seeks only to summarize and paraphrase key
biological concepts as they are related to AIS Danger Theory, so see
immunology texts for differing immunology viewpoints and more technical
information than what is presented in this paper.

Human Immunity
The human immune system has two descriptive systems, innate and
adaptive, that sometimes act together [94]. The innate immune system is nonspecific, fast, has no memory, and usually is of short duration. The adaptive
immune system is specific, slower in development, has memory, and is long
lasting. Both systems have mechanisms for distinguishing self from non-self.
[94]
Objects associated with the innate immune system, but which may also
interact with the adaptive system, include skin, cytokines, natural killer cells,
macrophages, and dendritic cells [94]. Dendritic cells have been known since
1973 but their importance in both innate and adaptive immunity has only recently
been more clearly defined. Dendritic cells develop in the bone marrow and then
circulate in the blood and some tissues where they play a role in surveillance.
(They are named for their branched projections which are similar to dendrites of
neurons, but a dendritic cell only has this appearance and is not a neuron.)
When dendritic cells are activated they become mature and are the only cells
capable of activating T-cells. Dendritic cells are activated upon exposure to
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danger signals, such as cytokines, and Pathogen-Associated Molecular Patterns
(PAMPs). When activated, dendritic cells migrate to lymph nodes where they
present the associated antigen to T-cells and help to define the T-cell response.
[94]
The adaptive immune system has two general systems: humoral
immunity and cell-mediated immunity [94]. Humoral immunity is found in extracellular body fluid or serum, and is mediated by antibodies produced by B-cells.
The complement of an antibody is an antigen, which is a substance or molecule
that is a possible invader and that triggers the production of antibodies. This is
sometimes referred to as a self/non-self system with antibodies being a part of
the self which looks for antigens which are conceptually the non-self. [95]
Antibodies find antigens by binding with them. Binding (also called matching or
fitting) occurs at a binding site, which is complementary in size, shape, charge,
and hydrophobic or hydrophilic character [96]. The part of the antigen which
matches an antibody is called the epitope. Self/non-self immunity protection has
a direct comparison with anomaly detection in information security: determine
what is normal (self), and then look for what is not normal (non-self). [94]
Cell-mediated immunity involves T-cells, which originate in bone marrow
and develop in the thymus, after which they enter the blood stream. [94] T-cells
are adept at identifying and killing cells that have been infected by pathogens.
Helper T-cells regulate the humoral immune system and cytotoxic (killer) T-cells
destroy infected cells.
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Table 14, Comparison of Immune Systems

Table 14 shows some general comparisons between the types of immune
systems. Not all experts agree on these divisions, so see immunology texts for
more detailed information. The innate and adaptive immune systems interact
with each other. A phagocyte is an eating cell that consumes pathogens or
particles as part of immune activity. A macrophage is a type of phagocyte that
digests the invader as part of the innate immune system. However, it sometimes
presents part of the invader, the antigen, at its cell boundary. The part of the
macrophage which presents the antigen is called the Major Histocompatibility
Complex (MHC). A cell that presents an antigen, such as a macrophage, is
called an Antigen Presenting Cell (APC). A dendritic cell is also a kind of APC.
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Negative Selection in Immunity
The immune system uses a process which computer scientists have
labeled a Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA)—rather than looking for intruders,
the immune system looks for non-self. Parts of the following description are from
[97]. B-cells produce many potential antibodies with each B-cell producing only a
single type of potential antibody. The potential antibodies are compared with self
and the ones that are similar to self are eliminated, so only antibodies that do not
match with self remain. The result is that whatever the remaining antibodies
match with is non-self. These remaining antibodies are then dispatched to look
for matching antigens. When an antigen is found, the B-cells which make the
corresponding antibody then make mass quantities of this particular antibody in
order to find more of the same antigen. Helper T-cells regulate this B-cell
activity. A B-cell whose antibody has matched an antigen is called mature or a
plasma cell. Mutations of the antibody occur to improve the matching with the
found antigen. Memory cells remember this antibody in order to continue looking
for this antigen in the future. Since there is an almost infinite variety of possible
foreign molecules, an enormous amount of antibodies are needed. This is done
biologically by using chains of molecules in the antibody which can be shuffled
for different combinations of matches. An estimated 24 million combinations are
possible which are increased even further by other means. An immediate
problem is apparent in imitating this biological activity on a computer: the
biological activity is massively parallel with all of the numerous B-cells and
antigens being processed at the same time, whereas on a computer, a Central
Processing Unit (CPU) can only process the activity of one B-cell or antigen at a
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time. If an antibody matches an antigen and is activated, then it is duplicated by
clonal selection in order to broaden the search and find more of the same
antigen. Any B-cells which make this antibody are signaled to start mutating in
order to attempt to find a better match for this particular antigen. These activated
B-cells also start tagging the antigens so that macrophages and neutrophils can
identify them and destroy them. These activated B-cells also reproduce as a
memory cell in case the same antigen appears in the future. Some future
antibodies are positively selected (instead of NSA) to match remembered
antigens.
The cell-mediated immune system T-cells also detect antigens using TCell Receptors on their cell walls using a negative selection method similar to
antibodies [97]. However, antibodies can match whole foreign antigens, but Tcell receptors can only match digested fragments of antigens presented by a
Major Histocompatibility Complex (MHC). Two kinds of T-Cells react two
different ways when matching an antigen presented by an MHC: a helper T-Cell
then proceeds to activate B-cells which make the corresponding antibody while a
killer T-cell simply kills the host cell presenting the antigen. A killer T-cell is
sometimes called a cytotoxic T-cell. Activated T-cells reproduce to save a
memory of the antigen. Some future T-cells are positively selected (instead of
NSA) to match remembered antigens. [97]
A Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA) is simple without the scientific
microbiology terminology:
1. Generate random detectors
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2. If a detector matches self, then eliminate it.
3. If a detector matches anything else, trigger a response.
4. Periodically recycle detectors, keeping the ones that have triggered
a response.

Danger Theory in Immunity
Besides computation time, this algorithm has obvious problems in biology:
bacteria in the intestines is foreign, for example, but is not dangerous; cancerous
cells are self, but are dangerous. Likewise in network intrusion detection, an
anomaly often turns out to be legitimate user behavior, and malicious behavior
can be disguised as normal network traffic. Matzinger [77] addressed this
problem in biology in 1994 noting that the immune system is far more concerned
with danger and potential destruction than with the distinction between self and
non-self. She questioned why some foreign objects elicit immune responses
while silicone, well-boiled bone fragments, solitary haptens (parts of antigens),
and food do not. As a result she proposed Danger Theory. The concept level
with NSA is that the antigen is the indication of the intrusion: if one finds an
antigen then one has found an intrusion. Examples of antigens in intrusion
detection on this concept level are malicious types of network traffic or
fingerprints of malware found in network packets. This concept level changes
with Danger Theory in which the antigen is just a label that identifies something.
Examples of an antigen in AIS Danger Theory for intrusion detection are an IP
address or a network connection. The indicators of intrusions in Danger Theory
are a Pathogenic Associated Molecular Pattern (PAMP), danger signals, and
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safe signals. An example of a PAMP in AIS Danger Theory for intrusion
detection is a network packet that matches a Snort rule. An example of a danger
signal in biology is a chemical signal that a cell is dying as a result of an attack by
a pathogen. An example of a safe signal in biology is a chemical signal that a
cell is dying normally, called apoptosis. An example of a safe signal in intrusion
detection is network traffic that is believed to be acceptable.

The Dendritic Cell Algorithm
Dendritic cells are the arbiters of Danger Theory, deciding whether or not
to initiate a response to an intrusion. When a dendritic cell consumes a
pathogen or particle, it travels to a lymph node where it becomes an Antigen
Presenting Cell (APC) for T-cells and B-cells, presenting the antigen as being
either safe or dangerous. The process of deciding whether an antigen is safe or
dangerous is imitated with the Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA) [50] which is a
method of fusing a series of four types of input into a single contextual output.
The concept level has changed to a dendritic cell algorithm being a fusion
method for intrusion detection. The four types of input are PAMP signals, danger
signals, safe signals, and inflammation, which is just an indicator that may
increase the other values. An example of a PAMP signal in AIS Danger Theory
for intrusion detection would be the severity of a Snort alert with 0.33
representing low severity, 0.67 representing medium severity, and 1.0
representing high severity. PAMP and danger signals along with danger
contexts could be considered to be symptoms of infection depending upon the
circumstances. The algorithm maintains three interim values each of which are
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aggregated: a co-stimulation signal (CSM), a semi-mature signal, and a mature
signal. The co-stimulation signal represents the accumulation of evidence: when
a given threshold of evidence is reached, called the migration threshold, then a
decision is made. In biology, the dendritic cell then migrates to a lymph node
and presents the antigen as being either safe or dangerous. The semi-mature
signal represents evidence of safety, and the mature signal represents evidence
of danger. Here is the general formula for the interim part of this fusion from [50],
labeled in this paper as the Interim DCA Formula:

(

∑

∑

∑ )

(39)

The input to the Interim DCA Formula, above, is a series of values for
PAMP ( ), Danger (

), and Safe ( ), signals and an Inflammation (I ) signal.

Groups of these streaming values are summated with each type of input modified
by the corresponding weight,

,

, or

. The knowledge engineer decides

how large the groups of data are with the Imprecision Principal. This formula is
repeated three times per calculation with varying weights for each group of data
providing three separate outputs: one for the CMS signal, one for the semimature signal, and one for the mature signal. The two base weights, W1 and W2
in the table below, are provided by the knowledge engineer with the Imprecision
Principal and the remaining weights are either static or else derived from the two
base weights.
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Table 15, Weights for Interim DCA Formula

Table 15 shows how the weights are determined for the Interim DCA
Formula. When the Interim DCA Formula is used to calculate the CSM Signal,
for example,

,

, and

.

Table 16, Weight Examples

Table 16 shows what the weights would be, using Table 15, for each of
the three outputs of the Interim DCA Formula if the knowledge engineer set
and
example,

. When calculating the output for the mature signal, for
. These sample weights and the Interim DCA Formula can be

used to continue the example from the end of the previous section.
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Table 17, Interim DCA Formula Output Example

Table 17 considers a Snort alarm along with values from Table 12 to
calculate interim DCA signals and provide an example contextual output. The
PAMP Signal column includes a value of 0.330 representing a low Snort alert.
The sum of PAMP alerts is this one signal of 0.330. This PAMP signal
summation of 0.330 is taken times weights of 6, 0, and 1 for values of 1.980, 0,
and 0.330 for the CSM, semi-mature, and mature signals respectively. The
values labeled Belief in Table 12 are labeled Danger Signal in Table 17 and their
summation is shown as 0.744, which is converted by weights to 2.232, 0, and
0.372 for the CSM, semi-mature, and mature signals respectively. The values
labeled Disbelief in Table 12 are labeled Safe Signal in Table 17 and their
summation is shown as 0.338, which is converted by weights to 3.042, 0.338,
and -0.507 for the CSM, semi-mature, and mature signals respectively. The
interim outputs are aggregated across the rows with the sum for the CSM Signal
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being 7.254, the sum for the semi-mature Signal being 0.338, and the sum for
the mature Signal being 0.195. The concept level has changed to Snort and
SOM outputs becoming biological inputs to artificial dendritic cells.
To obtain a contextual output for the example in Table 17, first consider
the interim CSM Signal of 7.254. If that is enough stimulation, then the DCA is
ready to determine the contextual output. If that is not enough stimulation, then
the DCA needs more input. The knowledge engineer determines using the
Imprecision Principal what constitutes enough stimulation to determine if enough
information has been considered to produce an output. In a system with multiple
artificial dendritic cells, the thresholds can be set randomly within a range.
Suppose for this example that 7.254 is enough stimulation. Then, the semimature signal is compared to the mature signal. If the semi-mature signal is
greater than the mature signal, then the contextual output is safe; otherwise the
contextual output is danger. If the context is danger, then the dendritic cell
presents the antigen as being danger and immune response (incident response)
is initiated; otherwise, it is not initiated. In this example, since the semi-mature
signal of 0.338 is greater than the mature signal of 0.195, the contextual output is
safe, the artificial dendritic cell presents the antigen as being safe, and immune
response (incident response) is not initiated. The DCA is intended for multiple
artificial dendritic cells, each of which can consider different inputs in different
time frames. With multiple dendritic cells the immune response depends upon
the greater of semi-mature or mature contexts.
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METHODOLOGY SUMMARY
This chapter explained methodologies for components of the system with
examples from early research using firewall logs. The next chapter shows how
these methodologies were implemented with data collected from the Invisible
Mobil Network Bridge (IMNB) using new dynamic methods.
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CHAPTER 4 – IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS

This chapter demonstrates the implementation and results of the
methodology developed in the previous chapter using data collected by the
Invisible Mobile Network Bridge (IMNB) instead of from firewall logs. This
chapter also explains how the training factor was automatically created initially
for each neighborhood size and changed dynamically during the training, as well
as how the neighborhood sizes were changed dynamically during the training. A
new training monitoring method is demonstrated. The newly trained SOM is
analyzed with new color maps and a new 3D map being created, showing danger
and safe zones. A method is shown of automatically applying FIS. New data is
used to test the Danger Theory aspects of the new hybrid, and the potential of an
evolving universal SOM is explained.
The IMNB made network traffic captures in 53 separate sessions including
traffic involving desktops, laptops, lab computers, subnets, and computers known
to be infected with malware. The network traffic included live connections to the
Internet and simulated network traffic using INetSim [98]. Samples included
boots, active directory and local logins, shutdowns, browsing, heavy usage,
videos, pornography, banking, inactivity, both static and dynamic IP addresses, a
variety of operating systems, and long and short duration captures. Malware
traffic was related to a computer with multiple infections, a prober, a computer
with TDSS/TDL4, and a computer with the Blackhole Exploit Pack. In order to
distinguish this new ANNaBell from 1D ANNaBell and 3D ANNaBell, this new
version is called LLNIDS ANNaBell.
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Original captures for LLNIDS ANNaBell were saved to binary pcap files
(creating sets of transmission, T ) which were translated with tcpdump to text files
(creating sets of events, E, with tcpdump adding metadata, M., producing
records, R, and logs, L). A script obfuscated the local IP addresses to remove
identifying information. These text files were processed by another script to
create aggregate vectors ( ) in 10-second increments. These increments were
further aggregated into 60-second sliding windows, creating a potential data input
matrix (D). Most of these vectors from D were saved in a file for training (
and the remaining were saved in a file for testing (

)

).

Features for LLNIDS ANNaBell were selected primarily based on the
previous successes of 1D ANNaBell and 3D ANNaBell. The words subject and
alien are used in describing IP addresses in the features, indicating which side of
the Invisible Mobile Network Bridge (IMNB) an IP address is active on. The alien
side of the IMNB is the side connected with the Internet or the simulated network,
such as INetSim. The Subject side is the other side of the IMNB which is
connected to the one or more computers or subnet which is being analyzed. In
network traffic coming from the subject computer and/or the subject subnet, the
source IP addresses are the subject IP addresses. All other IP addresses are
alien. While 1D ANNaBell and 3D ANNaBell were based on a Vulture Fest
model of attempted, but denied, alien network traffic, LLNIDS ANNaBell is based
on two-way actual (not denied) network traffic. For this reason, one-way alien
traffic is ignored in LLNIDS ANNaBell. The features for LLNIDS ANNaBell are as
follows:
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ip_count

The number of subject IP addresses involved in the

network traffic. Naively this would be one IP address, but some
computers used multiple IP addresses and some of the traffic
included numerous local IP addresses on a subnet. For traffic
involving multiple subject IP addresses, such as for a subnet,
vectors were created for each subject IP address and also for the
subnet as a whole.


tot_count



uniq_aliens The number of unique alien IP addresses which are

The total count of records, R.

being communicated with by subject IP addresses. This would
typically be non-local IP addresses out on the Internet, IP
addresses on another subnet, or IP addresses spoofed by a fake
network such as INetSim.


uniq_ports

The number of unique destination ports in the traffic.



port_ave

The average of the port numbers of the destination

ports in the traffic.


tcp_rat



bytes The total number of bytes involved in the traffic.

The ratio of TCP protocol in the traffic.

ip_count was included as a new feature because it helps to differentiate
between subnets and individual computers and also because single computers
might be using more than one IP address. tot_count was used successfully in
1D ANNaBell and 3D ANNaBell. uniq_aliens and uniq_ports are used similarly
as in 1D ANNaBell and 3D ANNaBell, except here they are counts and not ratios.
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port_ave is an indicator of how much high-numbered destination ports are used
in the traffic. lo_port (for lowest destination port) was used in 1D ANNaBell but
was not indicative of malware, so this feature was eliminated. hi_port (for highest
destination port) was successfully used in 3D ANNaBell, but port_ave should be
an even better indicator. tcp_rat replaces upd_rat (for UDP ratio) in 1D
ANNaBell and 3D ANNaBell because more ICMP protocol network traffic
appears in IMNB logs. Since UDP and ICMP traffic can be associated more with
malicious network traffic, tcp_rat is used as a potential indicator of safe network
traffic. bytes was added as a feature because the number of bytes transmitted in
the network is readily available from IMNB logs and this should be a notable
characteristic of types of network traffic. (The number of bytes transmitted was
not available for 1D ANNaBell and 3D ANNaBell.)
A SOM size of 91 nodes was selected which provided for an average of
approximately 31 inputs per node, slightly more detailed than previous versions
of ANNaBell. The vector elements were each normalized to a range of [0, 1]
during training so that each vector dimension would have a similar magnitude of
effect on the training. This normalization can only be approximated because
future high values of some of the count elements, such as the tot_count, cannot
be anticipated. The training factor is called eta in some papers and alpha in
others. Eta and alpha are interchangeable in this paper and both mean the
training factor. The training software was written in Perl [99].

TRAINING THE LLNIDS SOM
Several enhancements were made to reduce the SOM training time
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including how the nodes were set up, automatically determining the first training
factor for each neighborhood distance, dynamically changing the training factor
for each iteration, monitoring the progress of the training, and dynamically
determining the number of iterations for each neighborhood distance.
The initial

was created less randomly as for 1D ANNaBell and 3D

ANNaBell in order to reduce training time. In 1D ANNaBell and 3D ANNaBell,
the only special vectors were the origins, (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0). The remaining vectors were created randomly. In LLNIDS ANNaBell, all of
the initial

vectors were

vectors. Ten of these vectors were special and the

others were chosen randomly from
chosen for the initial

. These were the ten special vectors

:

1. The origin (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0).
2. The vector from

with the maximum ip_count value.

3. The vector from

with the maximum tot_count value.

4. The vector from

with the maximum uniq_aliens value.

5. The vector from

with the maximum uniq_ports value.

6. The vector from

with the maximum port_ave value.

7. A vector from

with the maximum tcp_rat value.

8. The vector from

with the maximum bytes value.

9. The vector from

with the most average values.

10. The vector from

which was the most distant from the origin.

Noting that the origin and most of the nodes (all except one) with the
maximum values ended up on the edge of the meta-hexagon in 3D ANNaBell,
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the origin and all of the vectors with the maximum values were assigned to edge
nodes of the meta-hexagon in the initial

of LLNIDS ANNaBell. The vector

with the most average values was assigned to Node 0 in the center of the metahexagon.

Figure 32, Initial SOM Layout
Figure 32 shows the initial node assignments with Node 0 in the center
being assigned the most average vector. The other assignments in clockwise
order from the upper right are Node 62, most distant; Node 65, maximum
tot_count; Node 70 maximum uniq_aliens; Node 75, origin; Node 78, maximum
ip_count; Node 80, maximum tcp_rat; Node 82, maximum uniq_ports; Node 85,
maximum port_ave; and, Node 90 maximum bytes. All of the remaining node
vectors were taken randomly from

. Figure 32 also shows the node numbering

from Node 0 in the center spiraling out in a clockwise direction to Node 90 at the
top, which is a numbering scheme similar to that used in 3D ANNaBell.
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Automating the Initial Training Factor

(40)

Formula 40 is the training factor, explained earlier, for the first iteration of
each new neighborhood size. It is the inverse of the maximum vector node
neighborhood BMI count for a given neighborhood size, s, and iteration, t. This
training factor was manually estimated in 3D ANNaBell, which stopped training
between each neighborhood size. However, it was automatically calculated in
LLNIDS ANNaBell, which continued training with the new training factor without
stopping between neighborhood sizes.

Dynamically Changing the Training Factor
The training factor continued to be automatically adjusted between each
iteration in order to reduce training time. This was done by keeping track of the
average movement of the nodes during training iterations. If the average
movement for the current iteration was less than the average movement for the
previous iteration, then the training factor was increased by 3 percent, otherwise
the training factor was reduced by 50 percent. The 3 percent increase was
determined by experimentation. The 50 percent reduction was necessary to
prevent thrashing back and forth between alternate sides of a target.
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Figure 33, Training Factor Adjustments
Figure 33 illustrates the rational of the per-iteration training factor
adjustment. The exact location of the target (star) is not necessarily known
during the approach. Moving from left to right the training factor is increased by 3
percent per iteration as the target is approached in order to reduce the time in
reaching the target. When the target is overshot, the training factor is reduced by
50 percent so that the target is continued to be approached without just thrashing
back and forth between alternate sides of the target. In SOM training, a target is
the theoretical location where a node best represents a cluster of input vectors.
The SOM training factor is adjusted based on an average of all of the node
vector changes. This average is determined by monitoring the SOM training.

Monitoring the Progress
Below is the standard output report for a single iteration of LLNIDS
ANNaBell:
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Iteration 0 distance 10.
alpha 0.000353606789250354.
This iteration lasted 0.130956367651621 minutes.
Average change = 0.339842126153345.
BMN changes: 2828. Max BMI: 2828
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The above output provides the following information. This is the report for
Iteration 0 with a neighborhood distance of 10. The training factor was
0.000353606789250354 and the processing time for this iteration was
0.130956367651621 minutes. There were 2,828 changes for a BMN and the
maximum count of BMI for the largest neighborhood was 2,828. A text-based
meta-hexagon then provides a summary of the distribution of the BMI for each
node. A period (.) represents no BMI for a node; a 1 represents from 1-9 BMI for
a node; an X represents from 10-99 BMI for a node; and, an H represents 100 or
more BMI for a node. The next iteration was as follows:
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Iteration 1 distance 10. alpha 0.000364214992927864.
This iteration lasted 0.115660949548086 minutes.
Average change = 0.127156481290656.
BMN changes: 1677. Max BMI: 2828
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The above output indicates that this information is for Iteration 1. The
neighborhood distance is still 10. The training factor (alpha) has increased by 3
percent. The average change is less than the previous iteration. The number of
BMN changes has gone down to 1,677. The knowledge engineer can monitor
this output in real time to verify that the SOM is making progress in training;
otherwise, variables may need to be adjusted and the training restarted. The
processing time should be monitored because training can last for days.
Experience indicates that the training factor, the average change, and the
number of BMN changes should all approach zero over numerous iterations.
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Dynamically Changing the Neighborhood Size
One of the goals of this research was to determine a dynamic way of
determining when to change the neighborhood size. Experimentation showed
that BMN changes converged within a reasonable amount of time to zero for
each neighborhood distance, so this became the determining factor for going to
the next neighborhood size. However, a maximum limit on the number of
iterations for each neighborhood size was placed in the code to prevent any
potential infinite loops. Experimentation showed that after the BMN changes
reached zero, they did not necessarily stabilize at zero---they could go back up in
a future iteration. Even so, the first time BMN changes reached zero became the
deciding factor to change neighborhood sizes because this represented some
convergence, and the nodes would move again at the next neighborhood size
unless it was zero. A perfect solution was not attempted because a goal of this
SOM was to be perpetually dynamic with no final ending state. This will be
explained more when testing of the SOM is covered further below.
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Iteration 56 distance 10
alpha 2.42215458070362e-05
This iteration lasted 0.112553381919861 minutes.
Average change = 0.000119039384720208.
BMN changes: 0. Max BMI: 2828
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The above output shows the status after Iteration 56, which was the last
iteration at a neighborhood distance of 10. Note that the distribution of the BMI
has significantly changed so that most nodes have zero BMI. The BMI will be
redistributed to the other nodes as the neighborhood size decreases in the
training. Experience has shown that, in general, BMI are distributed to the outer
nodes at first, and then redistributed to the inner nodes.
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Iteration 309 distance 5
alpha 1.36307815988189e-05.
This iteration lasted 0.0593816002209981 minutes.
Average change = 6.91557543954126e-05.
BMN changes: 0. Max BMI: 2828
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The above output shows the status at the last iteration for a neighborhood
distance of 5. Note that the training factor and the average change are both
minute. The above output was to the screen for real-time monitoring. A log file
was also created
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Iteration 476 distance 0
alpha 0.000826913829579694.
This iteration lasted 0.0147421836853027 minutes.
Average change = 0.000338512549388827.
BMN changes: 0. Max BMI: 326
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31.7587482492129 minutes.

The above output shows the status when the SOM training stopped. Note
the total elapsed time of approximately 32 minutes which is substantially less
than the 6-day training time of 1D ANNaBell and the 2-day training time of 3D
ANNaBell. The speed is attributed to a more focused data set, enhanced
automatic training monitoring, optimized code, and better hardware. The training
time could probably be further reduced by using a compiled programming
language such as C instead of Perl. A log file was also created during the
training with a somewhat different focus on the progress of the training.

113
359 distance 3, Eta 0.000397011669280822:
0.00697095083557402 average change, (10 biggest at
0.03585063519038).
360 distance 3, Eta 0.000408922019359247:
0.00572748632108736 average change, (10 biggest at
0.0296745465177702).
361 distance 3, Eta 0.000204461009679623:
0.00684703722906379 average change, (44 biggest at
0.0623563975424632).

Above is a three-line example from the log file output. The first line shows
that for iteration 359, the neighborhood distance was 3 and the training factor
was 0.000397011669280822. The average change was 0.00697095083557402
and Node 10 had the biggest change at 0.03585063519038. One can see that
the average change increased from Iteration 360 to Iteration 361 so the training
factor was reduced by 50 percent, at which time Node 44 had the biggest change
instead of Node 10. This information can be used by the knowledge engineer to
monitor the status of the training.

EXAMINING THE SOM
Once the SOM has been trained, it needs to be examined in order to see
the results of the training. What changes during the SOM training is the location
of the nodes,

, in multidimensional space moving towards the locations of the

input vectors,

, in the same multidimensional space. The closest node to an

input vector is the BMN. Similarly, the closest input vectors to a node are the
BMI. At the end of the training, various nodes are in proximity to various clusters
of input vectors, while other nodes may be in between clusters of input vectors.
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Figure 34, Node Training Movement
Figure 34 shows how the nodes moved to accommodate the 10 special
vectors during training. The left meta-hexagon uses arrows to indicate
movement from the starting positions. The right meta-hexagon shows the labels
for the ending positions after the training. The most extreme vectors were in the
upper right of the meta-hexagon after the training. Although it appears that the
maximum value for tcp_rat, for example, moved from Node 80 to Node 63, it was
actually nodes 80 and 63 (and all of the other nodes) which did the moving in
multidimensional space. The data in the trained SOM can be analyzed many
different ways.
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Figure 35, Preliminary SOM Analysis
Figure 35 shows a variety of preliminary analyses on the SOM results
which were created using a spreadsheet. Yellow represents the lowest values,
with green, blue, purple, and red representing increasingly higher values. The
node with the highest value in each case is boxed in black. The Distance from
origin meta-hexagon shows the origin in yellow on the lower right with vector
spaces then located off to the left and then up to the right, with the furthest node
from the origin being in the upper right. The ip_count graphic generally shows
lower values around the edges moving in to the highest value in the upper
center. The tot_count, uniq_ports, tcp_rat, and bytes graphics generally show
high values in the upper right. The uniq_aliens graphic shows high points in the
upper right, but also in the middle left. The port_ave graphic shows higher
values in the upper left. BMI counts shows where most of the input vectors are
located in the map: generally on the lower left side. U-matrix indicates average
distances between neighboring nodes: the nodes on the bottom and the left are
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closer together while the nodes in the upper right are furthest apart. For a fullcolor graphic, uniq_aliens, port_ave, and tcp_rat appear to have varying and
distinctive patterns which blended together should produce a map showing
higher level patterns.

Figure 36, SOM Maps
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Figure 36 shows a variety of SOM maps from this training which were
created with custom Python [100] script. These maps take longer to create, but
provide more detail than the spreadsheet graphics shown previously.
Logarithmic values were used in the U-matrix meta-hexagon because otherwise
only one hexagon could be seen. The U-matrix graphic generally indicates that
nodes are close together around the bottom and left edges and are extremely far
apart in the upper right. The next seven meta-hexagons show the intensities of
the values for each of the seven dimensions in the vectors. Solid black
hexagons represent the locations of the maximum values. The primary colors of
red, green, and blue are used for tcp_rat, port_ave, and uniq_aliens because this
helps to visualize how the values of these dimensions are blended to create the
Blend meta-hexagon, which shows the most information of any of the graphics in
this group.

Figure 37, Alternate Blends
Figure 37 shows three example alternate ways of blending the data for
full-color display. Alternate Blend A used uniq_aliens as red, port_ave as green,
and tcp_rat as blue. Alternate Blend B used port_ave as red, tcp_rat as green,
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and uniq_aliens as blue. Alternate Blend C used tot_count as red, port_ave as
green, and uniq_ports as blue. The objective with trying these different blends is
to find the blend that best illustrates the distribution of the data by the SOM.

DANGER AND SAFE ZONES
Self-training in the context of this research means that the SOM was
unaware of what input vectors originated from known infected computers and
what input vectors originated from computers believed to be uninfected. The
SOM trained itself with raw unlabeled data not knowing what data represented
good network traffic and what data represented bad network traffic. In order to be
useful for information security, it is necessary to determine if the SOM
successfully distinguished between pertinent types of network traffic. Unlike 1D
ANNaBell and 3D ANNaBell where each IP address was represented by a single
node, LLNIDS ANNaBell was trained with moving windows of temporal network
traffic, so numerous nodes can represent a single IP address, making
visualization and analysis more complex.
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Figure 38, Blackhole Exploit Pack Example
Figure 38 is a an example comparing an office desktop known to be
infected with the Blackhole Exploit Pack with another office desktop believed to
be uninfected. The samples were taken while each computer was connected to
INetSim, and each sample is approximately two minutes long. The BMN for the
uninfected computer started with Node 53, marked with an X, moved to Node 82
as marked with an arrow, and then alternated between nodes 53 and 82. (Refer
to a previous graphic to review the node numbering system, if desired.) The
infected computer began with Node 44, marked with a Y, and then moved in
sequence to nodes 24, 3, 13, 2, 10, 70, 69, and 70.
Other infected computers matched other nodes and other uninfected
computers also matched other nodes, with some infected and uninfected
computers sometimes matching the same nodes. An enormous number of
variables are involved such as the type of operating system, whether the
computer is on a domain, if a computer is doing automatic updating, how the
computer has been used in the past, how the computer is currently being used,
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what other software is installed on the computer, what else is happening on a
network, how a computer is configured, and the available bandwidth. An infected
computer should be doing much of the same network activity as an uninfected
computer, but will also be communicating with its controller and should also be
participating in additional activity such as scanning the network, attacking other
computers, sending spam, uploading information, downloading additional
malware, or other activities as instructed by its controller.

Figure 39, Normal Usage Examples
Figure 39 shows examples of normal usage of computers connected to
the Internet. X is a student laptop booting, browsing, and shutting down. Y is an
office desktop idling. Z is an office desktop being heavily used. In this graphic,
continuous lines are shown instead of arrows; the timelines start at the X, Y, and
Z labels.
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Figure 40, Special Examples
In Figure 40, X is the subnet of a computer lab connected to the Internet;
Y is a computer running a YouTube video; and Z is surfing of a pornography web
site (which was considered to be uninfected traffic because the computer used
was not believed to be infected). X and Y in these cases are examples of when
a BMN did not change over time.

Figure 41, Malicious Examples
In Figure 41, X was a laptop which set off an alarm for probing the network
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with network discovery software, a borderline situation of malicious behavior. Y
was a computer infected with TDSS/TDL4. Since an infected computer will also
have normal network traffic, the nodes of the SOM representing only infected or
only uninfected traffic are not readily apparent by looking at the figures displayed,
so far. In order to more accurately determine the nature of the traffic depicted by
the various nodes, a histogram was created of the BMN counts for both infected
and uninfected computer traffic. In some cases, a node represented only
infected traffic or uninfected traffic. In the remaining cases a ratio was created of
the amount of infected traffic that a node represented.

Figure 42, Danger/Safe Zones
Figure 42 displays the danger and safe zone of the map according to the
type of traffic that the nodes represent. The red nodes (for stop) have BMI of
traffic of only infected computers, the green nodes (for go) have BMI of only
traffic of uninfected computers, and the yellow nodes (for caution) have BMI of
both types of traffic. These zones can be used to show symptoms of infections.
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Figure 43, Major Red/Green Zones
Figure 43 shows the three major zones superimposed on the blended
map. The Green Zone is the largest contiguous area where the traffic of infected
computers did not have a BMN. The Red Light Zone is the largest danger zone
which also has the most extreme vector values. The Moderate Red Zone has
less extreme vector values. The blended color scheme and zones indicate that
the node vectors in these areas can be interpreted both for fuzzy inference and
also for danger/safe signals.
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Figure 44, 3D Full-Color SOM with Major Zones
Figure 44 shows a 3D full color representation of the SOM, created with
Art of Illusion [92], with the nodes in the red zones indicated by red triangles and
nodes in the Green Zone indicated by green asterisks. The heights are
logarithms of the U-matrix values, meaning that the vectors of the nodes
represented by lower hexagons are close together and the vectors of the nodes
represented by higher hexagons are extremely far apart from each other in
multidimensional space. The colors of the hexagons are based on their heights,
generally with shades of green indicating lower elevations and shades of brown
indicating higher elevations. The area around the meta-hexagon is blue.
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EXAMINING THE LLNIDS FIS
The Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) was based on these ranges for the
dimensions: ip_count, 0 to 3.756307952; tot_count, 0 to 11592.18606;
uniq_aliens, 0 to 34.40384547; uniq_ports, o to 80.90343139 ; port_ave, 0 to
28071.80605; tcp_rat, 0 to 0.996178223; and, bytes, 0 to 9596203.858 (values
extremely close to 0 were rounded to 0). A goal of this research was to automate
the creation of the fuzzy categories instead of creating them manually as was
done with 3D ANNaBell. Experience has shown that extreme values are
important in categorizing network activity, therefore, these equally spaced
categories were chosen including very low and very high values: very low (VL),
low, medium (med), high, and very high (VH).
Table 18, LLNIDS ANNaBell Fuzzy Values

Table 18 shows the FIS results. The Green Zone, for example, had
ip_count values from low to very high; the tot_count values were mixed; the
uniq_aliens counts were from very low to low; the uniq_ports counts were from
very low to high; the port_ave values were from low to very high; the tcp_rat
values were from medium to very high; and, the byte counts were mixed.

APPLYING LLNIDS AIS DANGER THEORY
Separate IMNB data put aside for

was used to test the new system.

included sample network traffic from the computer used in a previous

126
example which set off an alarm for probing the network. The network discovery
software which was found on this computer was disabled and additional input
data was created from the resulting network traffic in order to compare it with the
previous traffic from the same computer while it was known to be probing.

Figure 45, Example Test Map
Figure 45 displays the network traffic node pattern of the probing
computer after the network discovery software was disabled. The previous
pattern was in the vicinity of the Moderate Red Zone and this has changed. The
new pattern includes nodes mostly outside of the main zones, but also includes a
single red node (marked with a red asterisk (*)) and two nodes in the Green
Zone. This sample represents approximately 22 minutes of network activity.
The Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) shown previously for 3D ANNaBell
along with SJ Fusion could be used provide an indication of the danger, if any, of
this test data, but this would be considerably more complex with multiple nodes
involved (with 3D ANNaBell, only a single node was involved in the FIS
calculation). Instead, using the ratio of infected traffic that each node represents
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in order to create danger and safe signals as input to the Dendritic Cell Algorithm
(DCA) from Artificial Immune System Danger Theory (AISDT) is a much more
direct method of getting an indication of any possible danger.
Table 19, Danger/Safe Signals over Time
Time
Series
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Danger
BMN Signal
5
17
88
89
89
89
0
90
90
82
82
82
82
82
82
72
73
73
73
73
85
85
87
87
87
87
72
72
72
72
72
72

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.80
0.00

Safe
Signal
0.94
1.00
0.77
0.73
0.73
0.73
0.00
0.86

0.00
0.65
0.65
0.65
0.65
0.65
0.65
0.89
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.69
0.69
0.61
0.61
0.61
0.61
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89

0.86
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

CSM Danger Safe Alert
1.41
-1.41 0.94
2.91
-2.91 1.94
4.07
-4.07 2.71
5.16
-5.16 3.44
6.26
-6.26 4.17
7.35
-7.35 4.90
7.75
-6.95 4.90
9.04
-8.24 5.76
10.33
0.33
0.65
0.98
1.30
1.63
1.95
2.40
2.90
3.40
3.90
4.40
4.74
5.09
5.39
5.70
6.00
6.31
6.75
7.20
7.64
8.09
8.53
8.98

-9.53
0.33
0.65
0.98
1.30
1.63
1.95
2.40
2.90
3.40
3.90
4.40
4.74
5.09
5.39
5.70
6.00
6.31
6.75
7.20
7.64
8.09
8.53
8.98

6.62 Safe
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
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Table 19 (Continued)
33

72

0.89

0.00

9.42

9.42 0.00

34
35
36
37
38
39
40

61
62
62
62
62
62
61

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

10.92
1.50
3.00
4.50
6.00
7.50
9.00

7.92
-1.50
-3.00
-4.50
-6.00
-7.50
-9.00

41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

90
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
82
82
82

0.00
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.65
0.65
0.65

0.86
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

10.29
0.45
0.89
1.34
1.78
2.23
2.67
3.12
3.56
4.01
4.45
4.90
5.34
5.79
6.23
6.68
7.12
7.57
8.01
8.34
8.66
8.99

-10.29
0.45
0.89
1.34
1.78
2.23
2.67
3.12
3.56
4.01
4.45
4.90
5.34
5.79
6.23
6.68
7.12
7.57
8.01
8.34
8.66
8.99

63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

89
89
89
89
89
89
90
90

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

1.00
0.73
0.73
0.73
0.73
0.73
0.86
0.86

10.49
1.10
2.19
3.29
4.38
5.48
6.77
8.06

7.49
-1.10
-2.19
-3.29
-4.38
-5.48
-6.77
-8.06

1.00 Danger
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
6.86 Safe
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00 Danger
0.73
1.46
2.19
2.92
3.65
4.51
5.37
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Table 19 (Continued)
71

90

0.00

0.86

9.35

-9.35

6.23

72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
82
82
82
82
82
82
72
72
72
72
72
72
72

0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.65
0.65
0.65
0.65
0.65
0.65
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

9.79
0.45
0.89
1.34
1.78
2.23
2.67
3.12
3.56
4.01
4.45
4.90
5.22
5.55
5.87
6.20
6.52
6.85
7.29
7.74
8.18
8.63
9.07
9.52
9.96

-8.90
0.45
0.89
1.34
1.78
2.23
2.67
3.12
3.56
4.01
4.45
4.90
5.22
5.55
5.87
6.20
6.52
6.85
7.29
7.74
8.18
8.63
9.07
9.52
9.96

6.23 Safe
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
82

0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.65

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

10.41
0.45
0.89
1.34
1.78
2.23
2.67
3.12
3.56
4.01
4.45
4.90
5.22

10.41
0.45
0.89
1.34
1.78
2.23
2.67
3.12
3.56
4.01
4.45
4.90
5.22

0.00 Danger
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
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Table 19, (Continued)
110
111
112
113

89
89
89
89

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.73
0.73
0.73
0.73

6.32
7.41
8.51
9.60

4.13
3.03
1.94
0.84

0.73
1.46
2.19
2.92

114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

89
89
89
89
90
90
90
90
90

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.73
0.73
0.73
0.73
0.86
0.86
0.86
0.86
0.86

10.70
1.10
2.19
3.29
4.58
5.87
7.16
8.45
9.74

-0.25
-1.10
-2.19
-3.29
-4.58
-5.87
-7.16
-8.45
-9.74

3.65 Safe
0.73
1.46
2.19
3.05
3.91
4.77
5.63
6.49

123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72

0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89
0.89

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

10.18
0.45
0.89
1.34
1.78
2.23
2.67
3.12
3.56

-9.29
0.45
0.89
1.34
1.78
2.23
2.67
3.12
3.56

6.49 Safe
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Table 19 shows the derivations of the danger and safe signals for the
example over time. Each line is a one-minute moving window of network traffic
and the lines are spaced 10 seconds apart. The first column is the sequence
number of the time series. The second column shows the BMN for that time slot.
The next two columns show the danger signal or the safe signal for the
corresponding BMN based on the ratio of infected/uninfected BMI for that node.
If the ratio is higher for infected traffic, then the ratio becomes the danger signal
for that time slot and the cell is highlighted in red; if the ratio is higher for
uninfected traffic, then the ratio become the safe signal for that time slot and the
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cell is highlighted in green. These calculations ignore any possible inflammation
and Pathogen-Associated Molecular Pattern (PAMP) inputs (Snort alerts). The
column labeled CSM is for the co-stimulation signal and keeps track of the
amount of stimulus for an alert. When the CSM reaches a threshold, 10 in this
example, then an alert is produced. The columns labeled Danger and Safe
accumulate the danger and safe signals until the threshold is reached. The last
column, labeled Alert, shows when an alert is issued and whether the alert is for
danger or safety. The calculations highlighted in yellow represent a single
artificial dendritic cell accumulating danger and safe signals, reaching a
threshold, and then reporting the status (safe in this case) to the body. This table
shows the calculations of 9 such artificial dendritic cells in sequential order, 5
reporting safe conditions, 3 reporting dangerous conditions, and one (the last
one) not yet reporting. Multiple CSM/Danger/Alert calculations could be
occurring in parallel, with a new set being started with each new line. The
formulas for these calculations were provided earlier in this paper. This AIS
Danger Theory analysis indicates that the subject computer was alternating
between safe activity and suspicious activity, indicating that a follow up would be
appropriate to see if this computer had an additional problem besides the
network discovery software. This analysis also indicates the times during the
traffic when a forensics analyst should look for the additional problematic activity.
The computer was no longer available, however, when this was determined. An
added benefit of this method is that the analysis can be done in real time
indicating when the suspicious network traffic is occurring, which would allow a
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technician to observe via Task Manager or other software what program is active
while the suspicious traffic is taking place.

Figure 46, Parallel Danger/Safe Signals
Figure 46 shows how the danger and safe alerts could be produced in
parallel with a new artificial dendritic cell starting at each line. Additional columns
were added to the previous table for the calculations of these additional dendritic
cells. The yellow cells indicate the upper left corner of each new dendritic cell.
The threshold was set to 3 for this figure in order to produce a smaller graphic.
In this sample spreadsheet of the calculations, the next dendritic cell, for Time 9,
would start off the page to the right. Eight dendritic cells are shown in this figure,
each of them reporting safe conditions. Producing alerts in parallel such as this
would provide faster and more detailed information to the security technician in
real time. The concept level has changed to artificial dendritic cells indicating
danger and safety in network traffic.
This system facilitates Type 1 Intrusion Detection by creating real-time
alerts of network patterns which are known to be malicious. This system also
facilitates Type 2 Intrusion Detection by creating real-time alerts of network
patterns which are similar to (symptoms of) network patterns which appear to be
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malicious. By indicating network patterns which are similar to other network
patterns which are similar to malicious behavior, this system is also a benefit to
Type 3 NID Research by providing potential ways of detecting intrusions that are
currently not being detected. New Snort rules could be created as a result of
using this system to monitor network traffic during times when danger signals are
being produced.

Figure 47, Real-Time Monitoring
Figure 47 is a dramatization of how the Invisible Mobile Network Bridge
(IMNB) could be used for live monitoring with the trained SOM hybridized with
AIS Danger Theory. Software could be developed to run on the IMNB (left)
which would indicate the BMN in real time and flash danger alerts as they occur.
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A security technician could take advantage of this system to use Task Manager
or other analysis software to determine what processes are active on the subject
computer (right) while the suspicious traffic is known to be occurring. Results
from live analyses such as this could be used to create new Snort rules.

AN EVOLVING SOM
An advantage of using

as the basis for the training factor is

that the already trained SOM can evolve with new input data without having to
start over with the training. The only existing SOM information which needs to be
retained is the counts of the BMI for each node plus labeling information for each
type of network traffic used as input. To continue training, use one iteration per
neighborhood distance per new input vector with the inverse of

as

the training factor as explained earlier. The initial neighborhood distance could
also start at a smaller size. Cascading calculations based on the SOM vector
values would also need to be recalculated as appropriate. As the SOM gets
exceedingly large with BMI, the BMI counts can be periodically fractionally
reduced in order to limit long term memory of the SOM. As the SOM
substantially changes or grows, it can periodically be retrained, and can
potentially become a growing hierarchical SOM [63].
An advantage of the LLNIDS SOM is that the data can be collected under
tightly controlled conditions. The LLNIDS SOM could be expanded into a
universal SOM for broader application by obtaining input from pcap repositories
which are available on the Internet. Here are a couple of example repositories:
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http://sourceforge.net/apps/mediawiki/networkminer/index.php?title
=Publicly_available_PCAP_files



https://www.openpacket.org/capture/list

A common infection is FakeAV and a sample of FakeAV network traffic is
available at openpacket.org. This sample can be converted to text with tcpdump
which can then be normalized and aggregated into input vectors for the SOM.
Here are the first three lines from the text of the FakeAV file showing that all of
the necessary information is available to create SOM input from this data:
21:02:03.865392 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 127, id 0,
offset 0, flags [DF], proto UDP (17), length 67)
12.183.1.55.54226 > 8.8.8.8.53: 11851+ A?
puskovayaustanovka.ru. (39)
21:02:04.051015 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 53, id
47400, offset 0, flags [none], proto UDP (17),
length 83) 8.8.8.8.53 > 12.183.1.55.54226: 11851
1/0/0 puskovayaustanovka.ru. A 46.161.20.66 (55)
21:02:04.052874 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id
41435, offset 0, flags [DF], proto TCP (6),
length 44) 12.183.1.55.44385 > 46.161.20.66.80:
S, cksum 0x573b (correct),
3572979361:3572979361(0) win 5840 <mss 1460>

Other samples of both normal and malicious traffic are also available. The
concept level has changed to a theoretical evolving universal hybridized
SOM/FIS/AISDT intrusion detection system.
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CHAPTER 5 – DISCUSSION

In this research, six years of experience was gained doing intrusion
detection on the information security team of central Information Technology for
the University. The literature was reviewed for information security noting the
complexity of intrusion detection. The literature for Soft Computing methods of
intrusion detection was reviewed for ways of overcoming this complexity. A lack
of analytical descriptions of data and intrusion detection types in the literature
was noted during these reviews of the literature.
Self-Organizing Maps (SOM) were studied as a possible solution and 1D
ANNaBell, a SOM, was created and placed into production for the University for
network intrusion detection. 1D ANNaBell successfully found Storm Worm
infections and other network security problems being the first known time that a
self-trained computational intelligence discovered previously unknown feral
malicious software.
3D ANNaBell, a SOM hybridized with a Fuzzy Inference System (FIS),
was created as an evolution from 1D ANNaBell. 3D ANNaBell produced a fullcolor 3D map with landscape features that was useful in forensics, profiling of
networks, and in understanding the SOM.
A high-level overall SOM+ diagnostic system was created to join several
components of intrusion detection together, much like a medical center where
numerous diagnostic methods are utilized in decision-making. Based on the
concept of a Local Landline Network Intrusion Detection System (LLNIDS), an
Invisible Mobile Network Bridge (IMNB) was created to collect data; the LLNIDS
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Types of Intrusion Detection were defined, the LLNIDS Computational Model was
created, and the LLNIDS hybridized SOM/FIS/AISDT network analysis system
was invented.
The LLNIDS SOM includes dynamic methods of changing the
neighborhood sizes and of determining the training factors. A neighborhood size
changes when the best matching nodes stop changing and the training factors
are initially based on the number of best matching inputs for each neighborhood.
The training factors then continue changing based on the amount of movement
of the nodes. These dynamic methods allow the creation of a live SOM that,
once initially trained, can continue to train as new inputs are entered. The
LLNIDS SOM can also in theory be expanded to become a universal SOM with
inputs from files of network traffic from other sources, such as from Internet
repositories.
The LLNIDS FIS helps to overcome the black box environment of the
SOM by allowing security technicians to correlate fuzzy descriptions of types of
network traffic with a full color 3D SOM. This FIS, along with Svensson Josang
(SJ) Fusion, can also be used to correlate findings with the AIS Danger Theory
alerts.
The LLNIDS AIS Danger Theory works in coordination with the LLNIDS
SOM to produce parallel periodic alerts signifying dangerous or safe network
traffic.
The SOM+ system as a whole allows a security technician to take
samples of network traffic for analysis or to monitor network traffic in real time.
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Samples of infected computers can be taken while connected to the Internet or to
a simulated network. The network traffic can be profiled or monitored live to see
when suspicious network traffic is occurring. This can be correlated with
observations of software which is running on a subject computer at the time of
the suspicious traffic.

Figure 48, SOM+ Diagnostic System
Figure 48 summarizes the SOM+ Diagnostic System. IMNB data is fed
into the hybridized SOM/FIS/AIS while Snort data is also fed into the AISDT. The
SOM produces danger/safe signals read by the AISDT, re-trains itself in real
time, and sends additional output to the FIS. The AISDT creates artificial
dendritic cells to aggregate signals and periodically send danger/safe alerts. The
FIS produces human intuitive output and also sends output to SJ Fusion. The
SOM/AISDT aspects can be used in forensics to create new Snort rules. These
components are all potentially part of a larger ensemble system consisting of
other intrusion detection components which also send output to the SJ Fusion,
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which produces a single output. The danger/safe signals can be separate output
or can be sent to SJ Fusion to become part of a single output. The entire system
is based on a foundation of ID Types and the Computational Model. The system
detects Type 1 and Type 2 intrusions with type 1 and 2 methods and alerts. This
is type 1, 2, and 3 research: it improves types 1 and 2 intrusion detection and
potentially detects Type 3 intrusions by comparing similarities of network traffic
with similarities of known types of dangerous network traffic.

Figure 49, The Larger Structure
Figure 49 illustrates how the SOM/FIS/AISDT hybrid from the previous
figure can drop into the larger generic structure of the diagnostic system. The
SOM+ Diagnostic System is modular because the various components can be
developed and/or programmed independently, yet they work cohesively. The
SOM+ Diagnostic System is multitaskable because it can be used to collect data,
on collected data, or for live analysis. It can be multitasked for detection
capability, profiling, or forensics. AIS Danger Theory, unlike traditional AIS, is
efficient and can be adjusted for scalability. The LLNIDS SOM scales well for
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live retraining because of the dynamic methods of changing neighborhood sizes
and training factors. The 3D full color SOM map coupled with FIS facilitates
intuitive understanding by security technicians. The red and green zones on a
live map along with danger and safe alerts also facilities intuitiveness. The
dynamic methods of the LLNIDS SOM allow for adaptability to quickly changing
scenarios. Periodic full retraining of the SOM needs either time or a high
performance computing environment or can potentially be mitigated with a
growing hierarchical SOM [63]. The Invisible Mobile Network Bridge can be a
simple laptop to monitor a single system up to a high performance system to
monitor a network, depending upon the needs of the system.
Advantages of the SOM+ Diagnostic System are:


The full color 3D SOM is more intuitive than previous maps.



AIS Danger Theory signals can provide real-time alerts and
forensics information.



The FIS presents a more intuitive SOM interface for security
technicians.



Newly defined intrusion types aid scientific analysis.



The computational model unifies how the data is presented in
numerous concept levels and methods.



The IMNB allows more pure captures of network traffic without
potential influence by malware and aids in forensics.



The IMNB can be set up for data capture without disturbing a
running subject computer.
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The IMNB can monitor a subject computer on a simulated network
so that an infected computer does not need to endanger a real
network for data collection.



Data collected from the IMNB can also be analyzed by other kinds
of software such as Snort and Wireshark.



The system can potentially become a universal SOM by accepting
network traffic data from repositories on the Internet.



The system is modular, multitaskable, scales well, is adaptable to
quickly changing scenarios, and uses relatively few resources.



Emergence.

Disadvantages of the SOM+ Diagnostic System are:


Re-training the SOM as it grows large will take considerably more
resources.



The expertise of a knowledge engineer is required.

Novelties in this research are:


The complex hybridization of SOM, FIS, and AIS Danger Theory.



Automated changing of neighborhood sizes and the training factor
in the SOM.



The IMNB for data collection and network monitoring.



The computational model.



The new intrusion detection types.



A diagnostic system based on a medical center metaphor.



Combining clustering and classification in the SOM.
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The Imprecision Principle.



Listing the numerous concept levels involved in processing data
from binary network traffic to sophisticated Soft Computing
methods.
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CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION

Information security is a complex and inexact process which lends itself to
Soft Computing techniques. Current methods are stymied by continuously
evolving malware techniques and the situation that determination of a virus in all
cases is undecidable. Network security is an evolutionary system where both
sides continually evolve to outwit the other side. Security technicians are not
capable of knowing what every single packet on the Internet is doing. This
research showed that Soft Computing methods can successfully be used in
addition to other methods for intrusion detection. The SOM 1D ANNaBell
discovered previously unknown network security problems. The SOM 3D
ANNaBell with FIS demonstrated that the black box internal workings of the SOM
can be displayed more intuitively for security technicians and that the system can
be used for security profiling and forensics. The SOM/FIS/AISDT hybrid showed
that artificially immunity danger theory can be hybridized with the SOM to
produce danger and safe signals for security technicians in real time for live
analysis, as well as for profiling, forensics, and intrusion detection, in a manner
which can potentially be evolving and universal.
Like the situation with Lewis and Clark when they headed West in 1804 to
see just how large the Louisiana Purchase really was: there is a huge amount of
unexplored territory in Soft Computing to be investigated. The SOM+ Diagnostic
System in this research is an archetype from which to move forth.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A, REFERENCE OF VARIABLE NAMES
Below is a listing of the variable names which are used consistently
throughout this paper.


Alpha. The training factor.



Alpha, size, and time. The training factor for a certain
neighborhood time for a certain iteration of training.



Delta. The change in



Change, vector, node, index (SOM). The change in vector
space for node i.



Best Matching Inputs. A label.



BMN Best Matching Node. A label.



d

Distance (SOM). Can be the difference in space between

two location vectors or can be the neighborhood distance between
two nodes, depending upon the context.


Distance, vector, input, node (SOM). The distance in space
between an input vector and a node vector.



D

Data. A set of V (vectors) or a matrix, depending upon the

context.


Data, input. Any of



Data, nodes (SOM). A set of the node vectors V of a SOM.

,

, or

.

A matrix D that represents a SOM.


Data, real (SOM). The set of data D that is real input for a
SOM used in production.



Data, testing (SOM). The set of data D that is used for
testing a SOM.



Data, training (SOM). The set of data D that is used for
training a SOM.



e

Element. A generic element in a set.



E

Event. A set of e (elements) derived from a T (transmission

set).


i

Index.



I

Intrusion. A set of R (records) for an intrusion.



Intrusion, Type 1. A kind of I (intrusion).



Intrusion, Type 2. A kind of I (intrusion).



Intrusion, Type 3. A kind of I (intrusion).



Intrusion Detection, Type 1. A function.



Intrusion Detection, Type 2. A function.



Intrusion Detection, Type 3. A function.



L

Log. A set of R (records).



m

Meta-data. Items of data about e (elements) in an E (event

set).


M

Meta-data. A set of m (meta-data items)



Number, Data. The number of elements in a Data set.



Number, Event. The number of elements in an Event set.



Number, Meta-data. The number of elements in a Meta-data
set.



Number, node. The number of elements in

(Data,

Nodes). The number of nodes in a SOM.


Number, Transmission. The number of objects in a
Transmission set.



Number, Vector. The number of elements in a Vector set,
vector, or matrix.



Neighborhood. A label.



o

Object. An element of a T (transmission) set.



R

Record. A set including elements from both M (meta-data)

and E (events).


t

Time (SOM). A count of the iterations in the training



T

Transmission. A set of o (objects) representing a frame or

packet which is transmitted over a network.


V

Vector. An n-tuple of real numbers. May be perceived as

being a set, a vector, a matrix, or in other ways depending upon the
context.


Vector, aggregate. A V (vector) containing aggregate
information.



Vector, Best Matching Node (SOM). The V (vector) for the
Best Matching Node.



Vector, detail. A V (vector) containing detail information.



Vector, input. A V (vector) used as input.



Vector, node (SOM). A V (vector) for a node.



Vector, node, count (SOM). The number of BMI for a node.



Vector, node, index, count (SOM). The number of BMI for
node i.



Vector, node, neighborhood, size, time (iteration) (SOM).
The neighborhood for Node i with a neighborhood size of s for
training iteration t.



Vector, node, neighborhood, size, time (iteration),
count (SOM). The number of BMI for the neighborhood for Node i
with a neighborhood size of s for training iteration t.



Vector, node, maximum, neighborhood, size, time
(iteration), count. The maximum count of MBIs for a neighborhood
of size s in training iteration t.

APPENDIX B, CONCEPT LEVELS
The concept levels in this research are presented in a general ascending
order beginning with binary code from network transmissions and progressing to
abstract Soft Computing ideas. Most concept levels as presented increase the
abstraction of the data. Here is a summary of the concept levels discussed in
this research.
1. A network transmission of objects.
2. A set of elements.
3. A set of meta-data about the set of elements.

4. A set that includes both the elements and meta-data about those
elements
5. A collection of sets of meta-data and elements.
6. A matrix.
7. A set of matrices.
8. Generalized n-tuples.
9. A multidimensional solution space.
10. A topological graph.
11. A feature map of vector dimensions.
12. A feature map, such as landscape features, representing groups
of vector dimensions.
13. Fuzzy inferences from the feature map.
14. Crisp output from the fuzzy inferences.
15. Individual danger signals.
16. Opinions of danger signals.
17. Discounted opinions of danger signals
18. A fusion of danger signals.
19. Antigen as an indicator of an intrusion.
20. Antigen as a label which just identifies something.
21. A dendritic cell algorithm being a fusion method for intrusion
detection.
22. Snort and SOM outputs as biological inputs to artificial dendritic
cells.

23. Artificial dendritic cells indicating danger and safety in network
traffic.
24. A theoretical evolving universal hybridized SOM/FIS/AISDT
intrusion detection system.

APPENDIX C, BIOLOGICAL TERMS
These definitions are generalized for non-biologist readers in order to
provide enough information to show context for the Artificial Immune System
Danger Theory. These definitions are not intended to satisfy strict biological
requirements. They are paraphrased from [50], [77], [84], [94], [95], [97], and
[101]. See immunology texts such as the ones cited for more strict biological
definitions.


Activated:

The description of an element of the immune system

which has successfully found an antigen. A dendritic cell which has
reached the threshold to make a decision.


Adaptive Immune System: One of two types of human immunity.
The adaptive immune system has two parts: humoral immunity and
cell-mediated immunity. The other type of human immunity is
innate.



AIS:



AISDT:

Artificial Immune System Danger Theory.



Antibody:

A substance secreted by B-cells in response to an

Artificial Immune System.

antigen.



Antigen:

Something which reacts with antibodies and/or T-cell

receptors. Potentially an invader. Potentially non-self in self/nonself immunity.


Antigen Presenting Cell (APC):

A cell which presents antigens on

its cell boundary where they can interact with T-cells.


APC: Antigen Presenting Cell.



Apoptosis:

Intentional death of an unwanted cell for the good of

the person.


Artificial Immune System: A system of protection based on the
human immune system.



B-Cell:

An antibody producing cell in the humoral immune

system. The B originally stood for the bursa of Fabricius where it
matures in birds, but it can also stand for bone marrow where it
matures in humans.


B-Cell Receptor:

An antibody which has been retained on the

cell wall of a B-cell. Compare with T-cell receptor.


B-Lymphocyte:



Cell-Mediated Immunity:

B-cell.
One of two kinds of adaptive immunity.

Cell-mediated immunity is mediated by T-cells. The other kind of
adaptive immunity is humoral immunity.


Clonal Selection:

The duplication of antibodies after an antibody

matches with an antigen.


Cytokine:

A chemical communicator between cells.



Cytotoxic T-Cell:

Killer T-Cell.



Danger Context:

One of two possible outputs of the Dendritic

Cell Algorithm (DCA). A danger context indicates that the immune
system should be activated. The other possible output is a safe
context.


Danger Signal:

Molecules from stressed or dying cells or

pathogens.


Danger Theory:

A theory of the immune system which

considers indications of danger for triggering the immune system.
Compare to self/non-self immunity.


Dendritic Cell:

A professional Antigen Presenting Cell (APC)

with branched structures that can activate T-cells. They are mature
(activated) or immature (non-activated) depending upon whether or
not they can activate T-cells. [101]


Detector Cell:

An antibody or T-cell in an AIS. A detector cell

has various states: a semi-mature state while it undergoes
stochastic sampling; a mature state indicating that it was not
eliminated for being self; an activated state means that it matches
an antigen; and, a memory state means that the activated state
was verified by a human.


Effector Cell:

An activated experienced cell, ready to kill

targets, help B-cells or macrophages, or secrete antibody.


Epitope:

The part of an antigen which can be matched.



Experienced T-Cell:

A T-cell that has responded at least

once to an antigen.


Helper T-Cell:

A type of T-cell that activates B-cells to make

more antigen. Compare with killer T-cell.


Humoral Immunity: One of two kinds of adaptive immunity.
Humoral immunity is extra-cellular in bodily fluids and is mediated
by antibodies produced by B-cells. The other kind of adaptive
immunity is cell-mediated immunity.



Immature Dendritic Cell:

A dendritic cell which has not made a

decision. Compare with semi-mature and mature dendritic cell.


Immune System:

A system of protection. The two general types

of the human immune system are innate, and adaptive.


Immunoglobulin:

A mature B-cell stimulated by an antigen, such

as an antibody.


Inflammation:

An example response of the innate immune

system involving increased circulation of the blood and other
activities.


Innate Immune System:

One of two types of human immunity.

The innate immune system has a fast non-specific response with
no memory and is usually short-lived. The other type of human
immunity is adaptive.


Interferon:

A type of cytokine.



Killer T-Cell: A type of T-Cell that kills an infected or cancerous
cell. Compare with Helper T-Cell. Contrast with Natural Killer Cell.



Langerhans Cell:

A type of dendritic cell.



Lymphocyte:

A B-cell or T-cell.



Macrophage: A kind of non-specific phagocyte that interacts with
both B-cells and T-cells.



Major Histocompatibility Complex (MHC):

A part of a cell wall

that presents an antigen.


Mature B-Cell:

A B-cell whose antibody has matched an

antigen.


Mature Dendritic Cell:

A dendritic cell with a matching antigen

and with a danger signal.


Mature T-Cell:



MHC: Major Histocompatibility Complex.



NK:



Natural Killer Cell (NK):

A T-cell activated by an APC.

Natural Killer Cell.
A cell in the innate immune system that

kills tumor cells and certain virus-infected cells, and does not
require prior contact with antigen. Contrast with killer T-cell.


Neutrophil:

A phagocyte in the Innate Immune System that

ingests and destroys foreign bodies.


Non-Self:

Chemical compounds which an organism considers to

be not part of itself.


PAMP:

Pathogen-Associated Molecular Pattern.



Pathogen:



Pathogen-Associated Molecule Pattern (PAMP):

An agent that can produce disease.
Motifs of

molecules that are not found on host tissues.


Phagocyte: A cell that ingests particles.



Plasma Cell: A mature B-Cell, one whose antibody has matched an
antigen.



Professional Antigen Presenting Cell (APC):

A macrophage, B-

cell, or dendritic cell that can activate a T-cell. [101] Any cell that
can activate virgin T-cells.


Safe Context:

One of two possible outputs of the Dendritic

Cell Algorithm (DCA). A safe context indicates that the immune
system should not be activated. The other possible output is a
danger context.


Safe Signal: A signal of safe to a dendritic cell.



Self: Chemical compounds which an organism considers to be
part of itself.



Self/non-self immunity:

An explanation of immunity in which

non-self entities trigger the immune system. Compare to Danger
Theory.


Semi-Mature Dendritic Cell:

A dendritic cell with a safe

context.


T-Cell:

The type of cell which mediates in the cell-mediated

immune system. The T is for thymus, where the T-cell matures.

Two types of T-cells are helper T-cells and killer T-cells. Compare
with B-cell in the humoral immune system.


T-Cell Receptor:

The part of the surface of a T-cell which

matches a presented antigen. For T-cell receptors, the
corresponding antigen is a partially consumed antigen which has
been presented by a phagocyte. Compare with B-cell receptor.


T-Lymphocyte:

T-cell.



Virgin T-Cell:

A mature T-cell that has not yet met antigen.

APPENDIX D, KNOWLEDGE ENGINEER DECISIONS
Below is a summary of decisions that must be made by a knowledge
engineer in the system described in this research:


Deciding the research type goal.



The design of the hybridized system.



The initial data selection.



How to normalize the input data.



The SOM size.



The original assignment of node vectors for the SOM.



What constitutes height in the 3D scheme for the SOM.



How danger and safe signals are produced by the SOM.



The color scheme for the SOM.



The atomicity value for SJ Fusion.



How often to start a new artificial dendritic cell.



What the base weights and threshold are for the Interim DCA
Formula.
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